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1 ABSTRACT  
 
Insight is a term used in adult mental heath to try to think about and understand 
how service users’ understand their difficulties. There has been a growth in 
interest in its potential use in practice. This has led to the development of 
multiple theories and scales. Research in this area has yielded a vast array of 
results. Although to date, this enterprise has yielded inconsistent results. While 
the various insight theories implicate different factors in their models, there is 
convergence on three recurrent themes: acceptance of mental illness, 
agreement with treatment, and ability to label experiences as pathological.  
 
However, insight in adult mental health is a term that is often used but rarely  
defined. This research took a social constructionist stance to explore the way 
insight is deployed by clinical psychologists in practice. It sought to explore the 
degree to which ideas about insight are used in practice. Conversely it also 
looked to explore if insight was not used what, if any, analogous psychological 
theories were deployed in their day-to-day work. The research actively explored 
a variety of contexts in which clinical psychologists might encounter “insight 
talk” and how they negotiate these contexts. 
 
Nine clinical psychologists working in a variety of adult mental health services 
within one NHS trust were recruited. Semi-structured interviews were used to 
explore if, and how, insight is used. The transcripts were analysed using a 
mixed design of Discursive Psychology and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. 
 
The results suggest that insight and analogous terms are used at different 
levels of practice. In terms of service user contact (micro-politics) “insight talk” 
considered insight as psy-model, narrative insight, and formulation. In 
discussion with colleagues (meso-politics), psychologists constructed their 
colleagues “insight”. At a system level (macro-politics) psychologists 
constructed systems as lacking insight and the promotion of a psychologically 
minded workforce. 
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3 DEFINITIONS  
Conditions of possibility: relates to the framework of ideas, institutions, social 
practices etc. that enable an entity or idea to exist e.g. DSM-V, and bio-
psychiatry enable and legitimise the “existence” of theories of 
schizophrenia as a biologically based mental disorder. 
Cultural capital: a set of social assets and skills that enable social mobility 
and/or access to circumscribed social contexts. (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Discourse: a system of statements about the world which make certain social 
practices and ways of ordering knowledge seem reasonable and others 
problematic (Parker, 1992). 
Discursive resources/practices: historically and culturally specific rules for 
organising different forms of knowledge. 
Dramaturgical: Is a sociological analysis that attempts to map how people 
manage themselves, their actions and talk in social interactions 
(Goffman, 1959).  
Governmentality: is a process implicated in the instruction, dissemination and 
enforcement of state sanctioned social behaviour at every level of 
society. (Foucault, 1978/2002). 
Ideology: system(s) of ideas, values, and believes that interact with social 
practices to explain a political order, sustain power asymmetries, and 
maintain group identities  (Chiapello & Fairclough & 2002). 
Interpretative repertoires: collections of culturally familiar statements that are 
common sense ways of organising accountability and managing subject 
positions in social interaction (Wetherell, 1998). 
Non-discursive practices: are 'institutions, political events, economic practices 
and processes' (Foucault, 1969 p.162). 
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Objectification: the act of understanding a person or institution with recourse to 
discipline specific tools and discourses and thus attempting to fix an 
identity/label to them as a result of applying these tools and discourse. 
Pastoral power: the convergence of specific set of techniques design to govern 
or guide the behaviour of others. Extended discussion is contained on p. 
64). 
Power: is taken from Foucauldian theory and summarised by O’Farrell (p. 149-
150, 2005) 
 “power is not a thing but a relation”  
 “power is not simply repressive but it is productive”  
 “power is not simply a property of the State”  
 “the exercise of power is strategic and war-like” 
 “power operates at the most micro levels of social relations” 
 
Power-knowledge relations: used in this research interchangeably with “power-
knowledge constellations” which are ways in which knowledge(s) are  
collected and deployed in social interaction. It is supported by power 
relations and attempts to be self-sustaining. 
Psy-encounter: relates to any service user – health professional interaction in a 
mental health context. 
Psy-technologies: relates to any psychology specific tools and mechanisms 
deployed in social interactions e.g. formulation. 
Regimes of truth: the ways that disciplines and institutional practices create, 
circulates and deploy knowledge(s) to privilege a specific version of 
reality (Foucault, 1982). 
Subject positions: implied positions within a discourse that may be taken up or 
rejected by a person and are implicated in identity or experience (Burr, 
2003). 
 
6 
Subjectivity: is related to selfhood or identity. However, while identity is a static 
construct, subjectivity is a dynamic and relational concept in which a 
contingent self is continually co-created and re-created in social 
interaction.  
Subjectification: produce subjectivity and/or to make subject to by recourse to 
discursive and non-discursive practices in social action. 
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4 INTRODUCTION 
Insight can be seen as an important construct in adult mental health. It is widely 
cited as a core feature of schizophrenia (Roe & Davidson, 2005) and has also 
been linked more broadly to “psychosis spectrum disorders” (O Connor, Wiffen, 
DiForti, Ferraro, Joseph et al., 2013). Clinically, the determination of service 
user insight can influence treatment decisions in terms of type and location of 
interventions offered (Klausen, Haugsgjerd & Lorem, 2013). Theoretically, there 
has been a growth in interest in the construct since the 1990s that has led to 
the development of several “insight” scales and a profusion of published 
material on the subject. Research and clinical practice has considered insight in 
relation to socio-demographic variables, past psychiatric illness, prognosis, 
compliance, severity, cognitive functioning, brain structures, psychosocial 
functioning and quality of life, and diagnostic category (Marková, 2005).  
 
As a starting point “insight” in adult mental health will draw on the construct 
definition offered by David (1990), who proposed service user insight as:  
1. acceptance of mental illness 
2. compliance with prescribed treatment 
3. ability to re-label unusual experiences as pathological 
Researchers have proposed several other variations. For example, Amador and 
Kronegold (2004) suggest that a service user with insight should demonstrate 
awareness of: 
1. having a mental disorder 
2. its symptoms, 
3. attribution of the symptoms to the mental disorder. 
4. the social consequences in terms of the disorder, and thus 
5. the need for treatment 
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While using different terminology, this definition essentially privileges similar 
ideas to David’s (1990) generic construct i.e. concordance with clinician, 
compliance with treatment, and constitution of self and experience as 
pathological. This succinctly summarises the main themes that emerge from 
several major scales developed to measure insight in people presenting with 
psychosis (Appendix A). It also closely represents service users’ 
understandings of insight applied in adult mental health (Dillon, 2011). 
 
It could be argued that this definition positions power within clinician to define 
not only the nature of another’s experience as pathological but also expects the 
person to accept this formulation uncritically. This ideology is problematic for the 
current healthcare landscape that champions patient choice and consumerism 
(Speed, 2011) and promotes a patient-centred approach (DH, 2005; 2006; 
2013a). 
 
However, insight, is a word that although widely recognised, is more readily 
used than defined (Tranulis, Corin & Kirmayer, 2008). While researchers might 
have the privilege of defining their constructs, in multi-disciplinary clinical 
contexts, like adult mental health, this lack of clarity may led to divergent 
therapeutic agendas, mixed messages to service users, team conflict etc. 
Furthermore, insight as constructed by David and co. makes several 
assumptions that could be contested and will be discussed in more detail 
throughout. However, principally it can be considered contestable in that they 
privilege a bio-medical view of distress.  
 
This research is concerned with exploring if, and how, insight is talked about by 
clinical psychologists working in adult mental health services. It is interested in 
how they negotiate the ambiguous and possibly contestable nature of the term. 
It will consider what alternatives, if any, are used in this context. Importantly it 
will consider what this does in terms of subjectification. Subjectification is a 
complicated term taken from the French “assujettir” which means both to 
produce subjectivity and to make subject to (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & 
Walkerdine, 1998a). Subjectivity is related to identity, but implies a dynamic and 
reflexive identity. Thus subjectification can be thought of as a process of making 
a variety of identities available in relation to the socio-historical and cultural 
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context (Henriques et al., 1998a). However, identity has been traditionally 
theorised as a reified entity; but the subjectivity proposed here is more akin to 
the decentred subject. That is, a subject that is relative and relational, and 
continually co-constructed in social action (Burr, 2004). The concept identity 
owes much to the enterprise of promoting the unitary rational subject evident in 
theorising of traditional personality and social psychology (Venn, 1998). It has 
been critiqued as an attempt to label an individual within a limited frame of 
reference (O’Farrell, 1996). Subject positions and subjectivity are preferred as 
both are more congruent with subjectification, which offers the potential for a 
contingent subject rather than a fixed identity. These terms will be returned to in 
the methodology section. In summary, this research will consider insight talk in 
relation to processes of subjectification. 
 
This literature review will begin with a brief history of the term insight in adult 
mental health and outline some of the prevailing models that dominate current 
theorising and practice. Psychoanalytic, cognitive, neuropsychological and 
narrative theories of insight will be reviewed. A critical appraisal will attend to 
methodological, epistemological and ideological assumptions that support the 
dominant “regimes of truth” (Foucault, 1975). This will be followed by a 
discussion of potential implications of language in mental health. Specifically 
how language is deployed to construct the service user, the mental health 
assessment and models of madness. This section will finish with a brief 
summary and rationale for the research. 
 
4.1 Literature Search 
Theories about insight have been developed for over 120 years and have been 
influenced by diverse fields in psychology. For purposes of this study searches 
were restricted to topics directly referencing mental health concerns. Searches 
used the term “insight” with “psychosis”, “psych*”, “schizophrenia”, “schizo*”, 
“mental”, “health” + “illness” in both “subject” and “titles terms” domains. 
Separate searches used “insight” with “depression”, “construct*”, “cultur*”,  + 
“personality disorder” and with the terms “capacity” and “psychiatry”. All 
searches were run on PSYCH INFO, PSYCH ARTICLES, and PUBMED.  
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4.2 A History Of Insight 
4.2.1 Constructing History 
History making can be considered story telling, which necessitates decision-
making in terms of form, content and the construction of historical fact (Carr, 
1961). This can create an illusion of historical inevitability (Foucault, 1975). 
However, the historian cannot detract from their socio-cultural and historical 
world-view in shaping the multi-layered and continuous decisions that shape the 
product of this work (Derrida, 1994). Therefore in this context, this history will 
not attempt to construct historical facts but will outline some of the early 
protagonists in the development of concept insight. It will posit some of the 
available discourses that made possible early conceptualisations of insight and 
how they relate to the modern mental health discourses. In history making, and 
in particular with historical enterprises in mental health, it is important to make a 
distinction between ontology and epistemology; noting that ontology can 
depend on epistemology (Berrios & Marková, 2004). Thus, ideas about the 
nature of madness, self-knowledge, the self, etc. make available both legitimate 
objects and tools of investigation and can have a determining influence on what 
we know and can know. That is our methods embody our theoretical 
assumptions and thus shape potential results (Danziger, 1985). What is 
interesting and congruent with a social constructionist approach is that different 
ideas about insight emerge from different cultural contexts. This history will 
briefly consider these ideas in relation to insight. It will then draw on Lewis’ 
(1934) paper “The psychopathology of insight” which will be considered as a 
distillation of previous ideas and a template for contemporary theorising. 
 
4.2.2 Etymology Of Insight 
Insight as a concept does not exist uniformly across all languages and while 
north and west Germanic linguistic codes have the word, Latin based 
languages don’t (Berrios & Marková, 2004). Insight as a construct in mental 
health practice and theory has evolved with ideas about reason, consciousness 
and self-knowledge, with the consequence that the meaning has become fused 
with these ideas. 
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In Germanic linguistic codes the word “verstehen” does not have a Latin 
correlate and thus is difficult to translate French, Italian etc. “Verstehen”1 refers 
to understanding and introspection and can be considered in terms of the 
totality of one’s mental and existential state including non-conscious aspects 
(Danziger, 1980; Ghaemi, 2003). This holistic construct and formulation 
requires not just the knowledge of being ill but also an understanding of the 
processes involved in emotions and volitions (Berrios & Marková, 2004). Also, 
the more directly translatable Germanic “einsicht” similarly does not have a 
Latin variant. It simply means insight, in the sense of understanding someone or 
something. It is not surprising then that different linguistic constructions facilitate 
different theoretical and applied use of insight. A brief overview of the French, 
German and British ideas in the early years of alienist-practice2 may help to 
illustrate this. 
 
This necessarily requires simplification here as the debates were broad and 
vigorous in each context. Nevertheless, some generalisations may be useful. In 
France, in the mid-late 19th century the prevailing view was that people could 
have “insight” into being unwell, but not be able to control their (criminal) 
behaviours (e.g. Falnet and Monel). In Germany, neither Kraeplin or Bleuler 
considered insight to be important in terms of diagnosis or prognosis in mental 
heath. In Britain, Maudsley believed the insane mind was incapable of making 
rational judgements (Berrios & Marková, 2004). These divergent views reflect 
elements of mental health discourse that are still played out today. Namely, the 
questions about the relationships between “madness” and rationality, 
“madness” and self-knowledge, criminal responsibility, and the degree to which 
insight is part of a disease process (and if so is insight a categorical or 
continuous construct)? 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 The word predates Jaspers but he was the first theorist to systematically apply 
it in the mental health arena (Ghaemi, 2003).  
2 Premedical term for psy-professions (psychiatry and psychology) 
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4.2.3 Constructing A History Of Insight 
As noted the history of the concept is inter-linked with notions of reason, 
consciousness and self-knowledge and historical construction of madness. 
Considering insight a categorical or continuous construct emerges from this 
connection (Marková & Berrios, 1995). Conceptualising insight as categorical 
can be thought of as an “all or nothing” concept. It is also linked to bio-medical 
ideas of mental health with the adoption of the sign-symptoms model from 
medicine3. This assumes that insight as a part of a disease process should be 
identifiable and measureable as a distinct entity. Alternatively, insight as a 
continuous construct moves away from this idea of insight as unitary construct 
and considers the possibility of different levels of insight for different symptoms. 
 
Categorical formulations are evident in Jaspers (1913/1963) who noted “in 
psychosis there is no lasting or complete insight”. While this may have come 
from some form of clinical observation, it is also a reformulation of earlier 
conceptualisation of rationality and self-hood proposed by Locke and Hobbs 
who posited awareness of all our experiences, and consciousness and self-
awareness and intrinsically tied to identity (Marková, 2005). Thus, madness in 
the form of the presence of delusions must reflect an absence of self-
awareness (Berrios, 1994b). This idea is echoed by Kraeplin (1919) who 
reported that in psychosis “the faculty of judgment suffers without exception 
complete injury”. The totality of the loss draws on Descartes’ “cognito ergo sum” 
assumption that we are aware of all of our experiences and that awareness of 
ourselves is a core part of our identity (Payne & Rae-Barbera, 2010). The 
implications are of a categorical insight and insightlessness as pathological, 
thus the person afflicted is yoked to the professional order to properly describe 
reality for them. It is also noteworthy, that a categorical insight is both 
constituted by and a constituent of overarching discourse of the unitary rational 
subject. This is the idea that an indivisible rational self is at the centre of our 
understanding of ourselves and is the central tenet of Humanism (Henriques et 
al., 1998b).   
 
 
                                                        
3 The merits or otherwise of this model in mental health will be explored in 
section 1.4.3. 
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However, the idea of a categorical insight was debated with Krafft-Ebing (1893 
cited Marková, 2005) and later Jaspers (1948, cited in Marková & Berrios, 
1996) who considered insight as variable but ultimately progressive over the life 
cycle of the proposed illness. While Maudsley (1885) promoted the idea that 
madness affected all of the brain and thus rational thought, self-knowledge and 
awareness of illness were impossible for the “insane”. Although these ideas are 
somewhat incongruent, they both make assumptions about insight as part of a 
disease process, a disease that at its core impacts on the individual as a 
rational being. Here we see the emergence of the ideology of biological 
determinism.  
 
In Lewis’ (1934) paper “The psychopathology of insight” we begin to see the 
consolidation of several core assumptions that permeate insight theorising to 
this day. Of particular note is the idea of insight as “the correct attitude to 
morbid change in oneself, and moreover, the realisation that the illness is 
mental” (p. 333). Lewis is in no doubt that the “correct attitude” is that unusual 
experiences are pathological and thus explicable through the definitions 
proposed by clinical psychiatry. This negates any personal narrative of a 
person’s distress outside of these definitions and renders them part of the 
disease process. Here we see the privileging of medical discourses of distress.  
 
This formulation is echoed in Jasper’s (1948) “comprehending appropriation”. 
An idea that emerged from his struggles to theorise about and measure insight 
clinically. He orientated towards an assessment of the service users’ “objective 
knowledge”. By this he meant, the ability of the service user to understand and 
apply professional medical knowledge to themselves (Berrios & Marková, 
2004). What is interesting is the uncritical assumption of objectivity embedded 
in this idea. In some ways, it is an early formulation of the social constructionist 
critique of diagnostic categories merely reflecting specifically defined ways of 
ordering information in the world rather than universal reified entities. However, 
it would be an act of extreme revisionism to assume that was his intention. For 
the purposes of this research it does raise two important ideas. Firstly, in 
privileging professional discourses, this formulation legitimises a description of 
experiences as pathological with specific reference to the knowledge and 
language of psychiatry. Secondly, it illustrates a facet of the idea of “Cultural 
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Capital” theorised by Bourdieu (1986). That is the ability to understand and 
deploy specific cultural idioms, ideologies and actions to facilitate access to, 
and the benefits from, a culture/group. This has implications for processes of 
subjectification. Thus in this context, is insight part of a disease process or the 
repetition of psy-professional discourses in order to make available or avoid 
various interactions with services?   
 
The construction of insight as an expression of the “correct attitude” as defined 
by psy-professional discourses can be considered one of the central ideas 
embedded in current constructions of insight (David,1990; Amador & 
Kronegold, 2004). In this vein what insight becomes is a privileging of clinician 
concordance over cultural concordance (Nordeck & van Heugton, 2014). 
Promoting clinician authority over patient subjectivity. Cultural concordance can 
be thought about in terms of respect for, and understanding of, culturally 
congruent ways of understanding unusual experiences4. 
 
Of note, is the transformation of insight to an ontological reality and a site of 
assessment for clinicians – this creates the basis for the inclusion of insight in 
clinical assessment. For example, the widely used Mental State Exam (MSE) 
(Trzepacz & Baker, 1993) attempts to assess insight clinically and, interestingly, 
links insight to the patients’ attitude to the assessor (Martin, 1990). It can also 
be deemed an important attribute necessary for engagement in psychological 
therapies and somewhat circularly a goal of some talking therapies. Thus, by 
associating insight with both engagement and outcome, it can be important in 
determining “suitability” (i.e. access to services).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 Jinn possession is a common explanation among some Islamic communities 
in the UK. Cultural concordance promotes a dialogue with religious workers and 
the community to more appropriately and sensitively develop collaborative ways 
of working to support these service users (Dein & Illaiee, 2013). 
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4.3 Theories Of Insight 
Lewis (1934) recognised that “insight is not a word of plain and single meaning”. 
This is partly due to its use in a range of applied fields and to some extent the 
cross pollination between them. This section will explore psychoanalysis and 
the implications for insight and the de-centred subject. Cognitive approaches 
will be considered in terms of CBT and the development of The Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale (BCIS). Neuropsychological theories will make reference to the 
assumptions embedded in research methodologies and linking insight to 
executive functioning. Lastly, narrative approaches will be discussed in terms of 
a move from dialectical to dialogical service user interactions and the 
implications for subjectivity.  
4.3.1 Insight In Psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis should not be thought of as one unified body of knowledge but 
rather collections of theories that share some similarities and many divergent 
ideas. Despite this I will attempt to outline some overarching and relevant 
themes in relation to insight. In order to do this, it is important to contextualise 
insight within psychoanalytic paradigm of the de-centred subject. This should be 
seen as a direct critique of Humanist idea of a unitary rational subject outlined 
previously. Freud (1933/1964) described psychoanalysis as the third 
revolutionary movement de-centring “the naïve self-love of man”. He proposed 
that Copernicus first re-positioned the earth from the centre of the universe. 
Darwin secondly re-positioned “man” as part of evolutionary chain and not the 
culmination of creation. Lastly, psychoanalysis’ description of the unconscious 
questioned the validity of a conscious ego as the source of thought. Lacan 
(1955/2006) was to take this point further and critique Decartes’ “cognito ergo 
sum” by suggesting “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think” 
(Lacan, 2006, p. 517). This refers directly to psychoanalysis’ proposition that 
unconscious thoughts, drives, and defences are dynamically engaged with each 
other without our consciousness recognition. Therefore, operating outside of the 
realm of rationality and negating the idea of a rational subject. In this context, 
gaining insight of this process is an active, but ultimately never fully realisable, 
goal. 
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In psychoanalysis, then, insight can be thought of as self-knowledge by the 
transformation of what is unconscious into consciousness - “Wo Es war, soll Ich 
werden”5 (Freud, 1932). It is the recognition of the interaction of our conscious 
world, experiences and relationships with our unconscious drives, desires, and 
defences (Malan, 1999). Gaining self-knowledge should be thought of as a 
dynamic process that involves the analyst working with the transference and 
counter-transference in order to make interpretations for the analysand 
(Lemma, 2003). For example, in Kleinian analysis interpretations of the 
transference might give insight into one’s defensive organisation, helping to re-
integrate split off parts of the self and thus be part of the means but not the end 
of therapy. The clinician is also expected to have sufficient self-insight to 
separate their own processes from that of the client (Temperley, 1984). 
 
Despite the idea that insight in psychotherapy is considered to be an important 
construct, there is limited empirical research on the topic (McAleavy & 
Castonguay, 2013). In part this may be due to methodological considerations. 
Insight in this field has proven a difficult construct to define and consequently 
various and often divergent measures and models have been used to attempt 
to capture it (Connolly Gibbons, Crits-Christoph, Barber & Schamberger, 2007). 
Furthermore, attempting not only to isolate but also capture the specific 
therapeutic operations that the clinician did to bring about insight has been 
equally problematic (Roback, 1971). This mirrors several other connected 
psychotherapy processes that are deemed important but empirically elusive e.g. 
transference and counter-transference.  
 
The paucity of empirical evidence has not undermined insight’s importance in 
psychoanalysis. For example, the symptom can be thought of as symbolic (Bell, 
2003), and this has led to considering insight as a defence in mental health 
(Laing, 1960), hypothesising that the experience of extreme poverty, isolation, 
and abuse are potentially traumatic. This trauma can be re-lived through an 
adversarial experience of care involving a potentially incongruent diagnosis, 
coercion and hospitalisation (Duggins, 2010). The patient unconsciously rejects 
this reality to protect the ego through defences e.g. denial. Van Putten, 
Crumpton and Yale (1976) proposed that positive symptomology e.g. 
                                                        
5 “where id was, there shall ego be”. 
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grandiosity, can be thought about in terms of a denial of the experience of 
coercive and medicated life on the ward. Similarly formulating lack of insight as 
a useful explanatory model in terms of negative symptoms of withdrawal or 
dissociation as a means to protect against engaging with their current 
predicament. Both formulations position considerable power in the clinician to 
both recognise if this process is happening and guide the person to what Freud 
somewhat optimistically termed an acceptable form of melancholia (Freud, 
1933/1964). 
 
Denial could be considered a key concept borrowed from psychoanalysis in the 
current mental health conceptualisation of insight (Marková, 2005). Despite its 
proposed clinical utility in psychoanalysis, denial’s uncritical use can promote 
individualistic formulations of distress and can negate the value of service user 
input thus entrenching power asymmetry. Indeed David (1999) somewhat 
myopically notes that insight in psychoanalysis became “synonymous with the 
willingness of a person to agree with Freudian theory” (p. 211). Alternatively 
recruiting “denial” in a formulation can open the possibility to explore the 
symbolic and “latent” content of e.g. “grandiose delusions”. This might open 
possibility for the system to formulate the impact of the potential powerlessness 
experienced by the service user, thus opportunities to extend and transform the 
subjectivity of service users and clinicians.  
 
4.3.2 Insight And Cognitive Psychology 
It appears that early formulations of insight were at least partially influenced by 
Gestalt theories in the early part of the twentieth century (Lewis, 1934; Marková, 
2005). However, this review will focus on more recent developments of 
cognitive and behavioural psychology in mental health.  
 
Behavioural techniques emerged as a response to the then dominant intra-
psychic models in 1950s and many of its proponents were psychoanalytically 
trained therapists. Indeed, in the formative years of clinical psychology as a 
discipline behavioural approaches were favoured as an applied-scientist 
approach (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). More recently, cognitive and behavioural 
theories link to insight in mental health through the theorising of psychosis as a 
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collection of disorders of self-monitoring and self-regulation (Beck & Rector, 
2005). Cognitively informed interventions (e.g. ACT, CBT, CFT, MBCT6) are 
used widely in services (Baer, 2005; Beck & Rector, 2000; Braehler, Harper & 
Gilbert 2013). Chief among them is CBT, which has been suggested to have 
clinical utility (Kuipers, 2005) and has the additional status of being a 
institutionally sanctioned treatment7 (NICE, 2009). However, cognitive models 
are built on the assumption that people become entrenched in dysfunctional 
thinking patterns and these can, and by implication should, be changed. This 
implies that a normative judgement (decided by the clinician) about the correct 
way to think about, and make attributions of, one’s experiences in the world. 
Explicitly the model formulates that we are subject to irrational thinking, but 
implicitly infers “normal” thinkers are stable and accurate readers of their 
experiences and thus anything other than this is dysfunctional/pathological. 
 
However, evidence from attribution theory (Ross, 1977) and from the study of 
heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman, 2011) suggests that people 
are consistently unreliable in this regard. In the case of insight in mental health 
the decision making process is further complicated by the requirement to agree 
with the world of view of clinician. This requires the service user to demonstrate 
an understanding of the ways of thinking, theorising and constructing the world 
of the clinician i.e. the aforementioned cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). This is 
likely to be a tall order for novice service users. Although, more experienced 
service users have been documented to demonstrate, what could be thought of 
as, cultural capital in order to influence restrictive systems towards their own 
ends (Goffman, 1961; Weider, 1974). This might suggest that mental health 
provision is implicated in what might be called governmentality (Foucault, 
1978/2002). That is, implicated in the instruction, dissemination and 
enforcement of state sanctioned social behaviour. This shifts the emphasis 
institutionally from the therapeutic to pedagogic and individually from dialogic to 
                                                        
6 ACT = acceptance and commitment therapy, CBT = cognitive behaviour 
therapy, CFT = compassion focused therapy, MBT = mentalisation based 
therapy  
7 “Treatment for schizophrenia usually involves a combination of antipsychotic 
medication and social support. CBT or another type of psychotherapy called 
family therapy are also often used.” NHS choices – psychosis; treatment last 
accessed 10.2.2015 
(http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Psychosis/Pages/Treatment.aspx)   
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didactic practice. However, Foucault was also interested in the transformational 
potential of subjectivity in response to powerful discourses e.g. in response to 
institutionalisation, patients resisted and created an alternative system 
(“underlife”) where different values and ways of being made possible different 
subjectivities than those espoused by “total institution(s)” (Goffman, 1961). 
 
In some cases the application of CBT within mental health services can be used 
to support hegemonic constructions of distress. Rathod and Turkington (2005) 
reported that short-term CBT can improve insight in the domains of compliance 
with treatment and acceptance of experiences as part of “mental illness”. While, 
Zygmunt, Olfson, Boyer and Mechanic’s (2002) review suggested that CBT for 
medication compliance is significantly better than traditional psychoeducation 
approaches. One might question the practically of using a talking therapy in this 
way. Issues regarding consent to engage in therapy are pertinent here. Also 
presumably, medication compliance must have been a goal of this type of 
intervention. However, given that compliance was also the issue (if only for the 
service), one might wonder about how collaborative the goal setting was and 
possibly even the entire intervention. Lastly, one might also question the ethics 
of deploying a talking therapy to get service users to re-label their experience 
as pathological and by proxy subjugate other possible narratives to explain their 
distress.  
 
This is not to say that the distress is not a very real experience for people, but 
suggests that in this instance talking therapies can become part of the 
discursive and institutional practices that attempt to fix power relations in a very 
particular way. Deploying talking therapies in this way promotes uni-dimensional 
constructions of distress and a control agenda (Szasz, 1972). As agents of this 
agenda, therapies and therapists run the risk of being associated with a “funnel 
of betrayl” (Goffman, 1961) that equates deprivation of liberty and autonomy 
with a positive therapeutic outcome. 
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This type of application supports the charge of psychology as the magician’s 
assistant in mental health provision (Cole, Diamond & Keenan, 2013). This 
refers to psychologists’ use of individualising talking therapies that implicitly 
endorse depoliticised and decontextualized constructions of distress. In this 
way psychologists’ orientation, models and methodologies are positioned as 
promoting and supporting the enterprise of bio-medicalism. A neo-Weberian 
analysis of psy-professions would consider the institutional practices used to 
support this position. “Social closure” has been suggested to be an important 
professional practice that promotes power asymmetries  (Rogers & Pilgrim, 
2010). Social closure is achieved by fostering the ideology of a speciality (e.g. 
clinical psychology) and monopolising the intervention technologies (CBT for 
compliance). It is worth stating the CBT for psychosis can, and has been, 
reported by service users to be a useful way for making sense of their distress 
(BPS, 2014). Service users have reported the value of the psychoeducation 
component and respectful relationship, while others have emphasised the 
coercive potential through this pedagogic component (Massari & Hallam, 2003).  
 
However, the development of the model “cognitive insight” in psychosis has to 
some extent shifted the emphasis away from clinician concordance. Beck, 
Baruch, Balter, Steer and Warman (2004) propose a model of insight that 
considers self-reflectiveness and self-certainty (over-confidence) to be core 
components of insight. The BCIS (Appendix A) was deemed to correlate with 
awareness of mental disorder on the SUMD and to reliably differentiate 
inpatients with a psychotic diagnosis from those without this diagnosis label 
(Beck et al., 2004). This study illustrates some key trends that reappear in 
mainstream research of insight in mental health. Methodologically, they 
concede that no standardised measure was used to diagnose the participants. 
This sidesteps an important issue in terms of a key variable in study i.e. the 
diagnostic category itself. That mental health diagnostic categories have been 
consistently reported to be inconsistently applied, even by the same clinician, is 
not discussed (Bentall, 2010; Boyle, 2011). In doing so the researcher and 
reader can avoid this inconvenient idea and unproblematically assume that the 
diagnoses were valid and consistently applied on this occasion. There is 
another issue that arises from a potential selection bias. Duggins (2010) reports 
that non-compliant service users can be problematized as lacking insight within 
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mental health systems. The degree to which problematic or problematized 
patients were recruited to the study is unclear. Thus, is the reported sample 
reflective of a group of “psychotic” patients who have already been socialised to 
the model, language, and practice of psychiatry in this setting? Is their 
expression of “awareness of the disorder” as per the SUMD merely an artefact 
of cultural capital made available through processes of governmentality in this 
setting? Conversely, are service users actively deploying cultural capital to 
“dramaturgically” perform8 the available role (Goffman, 1959) without agreeing 
with the terms of the reference of the study?  
 
In fact one might consider it to be ethically perilous to gain full consent from a 
participant that may be deemed to lack self-awareness in other key aspects of 
their life, and implicitly suggests theorists promote continuous over categorical 
model of insight. Describing consent in the context of questionable self-
awareness necessitates a discussion of capacity. But despite capacity being a 
key feature of mental health care provision and enshrined in legal frameworks 
(Mental Health Act, 2007 and Mental Capacity Act, 2005), it is rarely mentioned 
in studies. The BCIS has also been suggested to be more useful than clinical 
insight in terms of predicting outcome in first episode psychosis (O’Connor, 
Wiffen, Diforti et al., 2013). This enterprise uncritically presents progress and 
recovery as intricately linked with the modus operandi of standard mental health 
care (i.e. professional contact and treatment compliance). This link has been 
questioned by considerable and robust presentations by service users (Dillon, 
2011; May, 2000; Romme & Escher, 1993) and practitioners (Moncrief, 2008; 
Mosher, Vallone & Menn, 2005).  
 
There is also a wealth of evidence that suggests that for some people contact 
with services is important. Of this cohort, BCIS has been suggested to usefully 
predict who might benefit from talking therapy (Perivoliotis, Grant, Peters et al., 
2010). However, there is also evidence that talking therapies increases 
cognitive insight (Granholm, McQuaid & McClure, 2005). This type of circularity, 
can be connected to the aforementioned cultural capital i.e. that those who 
display evidence of socially desirable attributes e.g. cognitive insight, can gain 
                                                        
8 Is a sociological model developed to study how subjectivity is co-created and 
negotiated in social action (Goffman, 1959). 
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access to resources deemed useful to improve it. This has implications for how 
services screen for and allocate resources. In terms of insight, this type of 
theorising legitimises objectifying cognitive insight and associated processes of 
subjectification. 
 
4.3.3 Insight In Neuropsychology 
The neurological disorder anosagnosia has theoretical connections with 
cognitive models and has provided impetus to explore neural correlates of 
insight in psychosis. Anosagnosia can be defined as a deficit in awareness of 
disability arising from a specific brain injury in frontal, parietal and temporal 
regions of the brain (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler & Tranel, 2012). Early theorists 
made analogous observations between insight in neurology and madness and 
assumed that the neural correlates would inevitably be discovered (Marková, 
2005).  
 
Boyle (2002) notes that researchers have for over 100 years attempted and 
largely failed to find a comprehensive biological explanation for mental health 
conditions. On one level this fails to address the considerable problems that 
plague the validity and reliability of mental health constructs (Szasz, 1972; 
Read, 2013). Thus using a diagnosis of, for example, schizophrenia as a 
definitive, objective, and discrete variable in research is questionable. This 
endeavour also represents a type of biological reductionism that depoliticises 
distress – negating public and political responsibility to address inequality, 
trauma and abusive social structures and placing this solely in the domain of 
individual responsibility (Patel, 2003). Furthermore, it implies individual 
responsibility is diminished by the very biological and genetic composition that 
makes them vulnerable to disease processes. At the social and political level 
the recruitment of the discourses of biology and science in psy-professions’ 
methodology adds credence to the cult of rigour, authority, and evidence-based 
practice.  
  
 
 
 
 
23 
However, it is important to acknowledge that biology must play a role in our 
experience of ourselves and the world (BPS, 2014; Insel, 2010). Yet this 
recognition and the attempt to evidence it, presents more dilemmas for the psy-
professions. I will consider briefly the linking of awareness to the 
neuropsychological construct of executive functioning to elucidate this.  
 
Insight, or self awareness, in psychosis has been linked to executive functioning 
(Raffard, Bayard, Gely-Nargeot, et al., 2009). As a higher order cognitive 
function, this is in turn linked to the prefrontal cortex (Lezak et al., 2012). The 
term “executive function” owes much to Andrew Jackson’s9 political reforms 
who like his contemporaries believed that a strong rational political executive 
could contain and manage lower order irrational and emotional classes (Bentall, 
2003). This political ideology was mapped onto neurology and implied a top 
down control of our decisions and emotions. More recent evidence suggests 
that higher order functions are executed through the recruitment of multiple 
interacting systems (Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002), with some research 
suggesting that subcortical regions, e.g. amygdala, are central and at least 
equally culpable in higher order tasks (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2007).  
 
Despite the recognition of the brain (and indeed the whole body) as a complex 
interacting system (Head & Holmes, 1911) much of the research in 
neuroscience is underpinned by modularity (Fodor, 1983). This refers to the 
idea that the brain is comprised of specific domains (modules) that have specific 
functions. This potentially limits research in this field by using simplistic models 
(e.g. correlation and reverse inference) that attempt to locate function in 
discrete regions (Poldrack, 2008). Put simply, the tools and designs are not 
sophisticated enough to adequately model even basic cognitive tasks in the 
laboratory let alone complicated real world interactions (Logothetis, 2008). This 
statement in itself is a reformulation of the defence that biological psychiatry has 
presented in face of 100 years of failed research into biological aetiology of 
mental illness. That is, that there must be a neuro-biological model to account 
for schizophrenia, but the research methodologies are not, as yet, sophisticated 
enough to detect it (Boyle, 2002). 
                                                        
9 seventh President of the USA, 1829–1837 (Yoo, 2007). 
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To date the prefrontal, temporal and parietal cortices along with anterior and 
posterior cingulate, insula and cerebellum have been implicated in insight 
studies (Sapara, Ffytche, Birchwood et al., 2014). These results may represent 
parts of a yet to be fully described “insight” system or artefacts from the lack of 
conceptual clarity and inadequate methodology. It seems sensible to conclude 
that the search for an “insight centre” by biological psychiatry is likely to be 
misguided at best (David, 1999). 
  
4.3.4 Narrative Constructions Of Insight 
The models presented thus far privilege the conceptualisation of insight from 
the professional. However, there is growing movement that recognises the 
value for service users’ authoring their own experience (Romme & Escher, 
1993; White & Epston, 1990) and of the legitimacy in promoting narratives that 
are sensitive to their socio-cultural and historical context (Johnson & Orrell, 
1995). Being able to build a personal narrative that makes meaning out of 
mental illness can aid recovery (Dillon, 2011). Doing this using available 
familial, community and cultural scripts about wellbeing can also maintain 
recovery (Anthony, 1993). This democratises insight and questions the authority 
of psy-professionals’ ability to define another’s reality. It also represents a shift 
to the idea of insight as a dynamic, interactive, and socially constructed concept 
(Kirmayer & Corin, 2004). In effect, narrative insight opens the possibility of 
thinking about insight not as noun but a verb and the emergence of relational 
constructions of insight (Klausen, Haugsgjerd & Lorem, 2013). That is the 
transformation of insight from an object to an active subjective and relational 
experience of oneself. 
 
Epistemologically, narrative insight calls for a movement from a dialectical 
approach to a dialogical approach in the encounter between the psy-
professional and service user. In the dialectical method a thesis is presented, 
augmented by an anti-thesis and reformulated as the synthesis. This then 
becomes the authoritative account and the new thesis (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1944/2002). While interaction is implied the directional flow moves form one 
authoritative account to another and the interactional partner’s role is to present 
an anti-thesis – which may be taken up or rejected. The dialectical approach is 
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embedded in traditional insight models, and much professional practice, 
assuming a movement towards something i.e. ultimate decision on an 
individual’s level of understanding about their diagnosis and need for treatment. 
Positioning the nature of insight as a value judgement linked to clinician 
concordance can also be seen as an authoritative and corrective account of 
another view of themselves and reality. Thus, psychiatric insight limits the 
legitimacy of alternative knowledge(s) and construction(s) of the self and 
distress i.e. hearing voices as auditory illusions and a consequences of 
schizophrenia.    
 
In contrast the dialogical approach assumes multiple co-constructed meaning(s) 
of experience, reality and subjectivity. This has important ramifications in terms 
of the outcome of the therapeutic encounter and subjectivity itself. Firstly, there 
is a shift in emphasis to a collaborative practice, which calls for continual 
reflexivity in terms of the interactional process (Anderson, 2012). This calls for 
an interrogation of the clinician’s pre-understanding(s) that might drive 
inferences made about the interaction (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001). Together this 
necessitates a “radical listening” not only to the patient but also to ourselves 
(Weingarten, 1997).  
 
With this comes the potential of multiple, co-constructed, socio-cultural and 
historically defined mental health and wellbeing dialogues to negate the 
universalist assumptions of biological determinism. This does not mean 
adopting a radical relativist position, which can be considered equally 
problematic (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1994).  But it does prompt a 
recognition of the Procrustean nature of western mental health theories 
(Saravan, Jacobs, Prince, Bhugra & David 2004). In doing so it calls for an 
orientation to what is being constructed in the therapeutic interaction and how; 
but equally importantly what is being prevented from being constructed and 
how? For example, this creates the possibility of understanding voice hearing 
as distressing and understandable in the context of multiple traumas. In this 
case dialogic approaches enables both service user and clinician to be open to 
hearing and making available thick descriptions to compliment thin (bio-medical) 
descriptions (Geertz, 1973). 
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Traditionally constructed concepts of insight may not fit in culturally divergent 
populations’ understanding of themselves and their community. Furthermore, 
they tend to be static and resistant to change in contrast to the radical 
contingency of concepts that change over time within communities. Dialogical 
approaches do not reject diagnostic categories but consider them to be one of 
many possible equally valued and personally elaborated narratives. This opens 
the possibility of psy-professionals using “insight  discourses” as a means to 
explore meaning making and relational experiences that service users are 
negotiating and not simply a descriptive category. 
 
Lysaker (2002) suggests that patients’ experience of awareness of their illness 
is complex and evolves through multifaceted social interactions. It has also 
been suggested that insight narratives are multiple and fragmentary for service 
users and that they change over time (Klausen et al., 2009; Taylor, 2011). This 
presents an alternative to the dominant model that positions insight as 
aetiological and/or pathological. Roe and Kravetz (2003) suggest a model of 
narrative insight should include: 
1. an illness narrative 
2. themes conveyed in this narrative 
3. consequences of the communication of those themes in terms of 
empathy, control over illness, and quality of life. 
 
It is possible that some clinicians are less interested in theoretical cognitive 
short-comings and are more focused on functioning and recovery (Lorem, 
2009). Narrative constructions of insight suggest a more nuanced view of 
insight is possible. Interestingly, narrative models hold onto the idea of “illness” 
and are uncritical of the mental health diagnostic regime which may be 
objectionable to people who ascribe to the survivor movement e.g. the Voice 
Hearing Network. Nevertheless it could be considered a “turn to discourse” 
(Parker, 1989) and presents an alternative to the dominant models of insight. 
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4.4 Language And Mental Health: Subjectivity And Subjugation. 
It can be argued that any discussion of insight in mental health is necessarily a 
discussion of subjectivity (Hamilton & Roper, 2006). However, as previously 
outlined subjectivity as transformative process is associated with being subject 
to, a process of subjugation. Thus, the term subjectification has been used. We 
have been moving towards a “turn to discourse” and considering not only 
language but also the means by which language is deployed in professional 
theorising and practice. Heidegger (1971) suggested that "man acts as though 
he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the 
master of man" (p. 213). While it may not be true to say that Heidegger was a 
Marxist10, one can see parallels with Marx’s ideas on ideology and its 
implications for subjectification. For example in Marx’s (1867/1976) formulation 
of ideology “they do not know it, but they are doing it”, can be seen as a direct 
correlate.  Althusser’s (1971) concept “interpellation” attempts to directly 
connect ideology and the subject. Interpellation is the process by which the 
subject (identity) is constituted by ideology that is embodied in social institutions 
and their practices. The privileging of ideology, language and non-discursive 
over the subject heavily influenced post-structural theories. 
 
However, here we are considering the subject, as dynamically constitutive of 
and constituted by discursive and non-discursive practices; in effect by 
processes of subjectification (Wetherell, 1998). Thus making available a critical 
reading of the de-centred subject as not just the product of, but a producer in, 
social action, language, and ideology. Thus enabling an alternative reading of 
subjectivity in the social space i.e. Žižek’s (1989 p.25) interpretation of 
Sloterdijk’s (1983/1988) cynical reason as: “they know very well what they are 
doing, but still, they are doing it”. This makes possible radical social action by 
the subject strategically but contingently forging alliances to work within, 
transform, and challenge hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).   
 
 
                                                        
10 In fact it has been widely reported that he was member of the Nazi party 
between 1933-1945, however the degree to which he was ardent proponent 
has been the subject to much speculation (Žižek, 2008). 
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This section will consider the deployment of discursive and non-discursive 
practices and processes of subjectification in terms of service users, the mental 
heath assessment, notions of objectivity, models of madness and the psy-
encounter as a contested site.  
 
4.4.1 Users Of Services  
The labels used by, and applied to, the users of services have changed 
radically in recent years. The broadening of the franchise and expected roles of 
users of services is complex and comes from a number of, often competing, 
sources. In part it may reflect a change in the way that people who use services 
want to see themselves, the way that professionals want to see themselves and 
the changing political and economic ideologies that all contribute to shaping 
clinical practice. It is highly likely that these factors are among others that 
interact with multiple other factors including gender, race, ability, class, ethnicity 
etc. (Burnham, Alvis Palma & Whitehouse, 2008).   
 
People can identify with or be identified as service users, patients, healthcare 
consumers and/or healthcare survivors. This offers a range of subject positions 
that can be taken up by people that may be incongruent. For example, in the 
current political and healthcare landscape at least two competing state 
sanctioned labels are promoted: consumer and patient. The former, the 
healthcare consumer is strongly connected to the choice agenda (Coulter & 
Collins, 2011; Speed, 2011) and the patient-centred approach (DH, 2005; 2006; 
2013a). Both consumerism and choice assume the user of services has at least 
an equally powerful relationship with the provider in the market place. This 
increased power can be seen in the proliferation of service user forums in NHS 
trusts, the promotion of service user feedback as an outcome measure (DH, 
2013b11), and attempts to position service users at the heart of commissioning 
e.g. through the “patient reference group” (NHS, 2011). However, the degree to 
which users of mental health services who may be deemed “difficult” consider 
themselves consumers is likely to be limited. Patients are often problematized in 
                                                        
11 The use of the term patient(s) outweighs service user(s) by 175:6 in this 
document entitled “Transforming Participation in Health and Care.” 
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terms of non-compliance and disagreement with diagnosis and treatment plans 
(Duggins, 2010) and ipso facto problematized in terms of insight. 
 
It has been suggested that “difficult” service users are more susceptible to 
coercion in the mental health system (Harris, 2010). The right to determine 
one’s own treatment is imbued with the ideas of a unitary rational subject and 
the autonomous individual in the market place. Conversely constructions of 
mental illness within bio-medicalism can undermine subjective autonomy. For 
example, insight can be used as a powerful reversal of the consumer position 
and used as a gate-keeping mechanism. At one extreme, the positioning of 
service users as unable to know their “true” level of illness and need can lead to 
patriarchal models of care e.g. hospitalization and forced medication. On the 
other hand exclusion from services can be couched in the language of 
thresholds, suitability, and complexity. The professionals’ decision about insight 
can then become a powerful tool determining access to service but also the 
nature of the service offered (Klausen et al., 2013). 
 
4.4.2 Mental Health Assessment 
The assessment in mental health can be considered a primary site for the 
deployment of authorised language and potentially positions the assessor as 
the master of truth (Foucault, 1975). It can also be considered a template for all 
patient-professional encounters (psy-encounters) and one way in which subject 
positions are enabled and disabled e.g. patient-subject or survivor-subject. 
However, the approach taken in the psy-encounter can also be seen to create a 
professional-subject. Professional subject positions have become increasingly 
theorised, for example the professional as expert and/or collaborative (Madsen, 
2007). 
 
Professional discourses can be presented as new technologies and procedures 
for understanding. However, the suggestion of discontinuity often obscures the 
reformulation of a longstanding mechanism of power. At a macro level this can 
be seen, for example, in the association of the Enlightenment with the discovery 
and democratisation of liberty, individuality and rationality; a rampant expansion 
of the discourses and possibilities of subjectivity. Conversely, it could also be 
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seen as a period that heralded the invention of the disciplines (psychiatry, 
psychology, medicine, penology, and pedagogy) that has each strived to 
develop not only discourses but also institutional mechanisms to explain, define 
and confine subjectivity (Foucault, 1975). At a micro level the psy-encounter 
also presents as a new technology but it has also been suggested to be a 
reformulation of existing mechanisms of power and an expression of “pastoral 
power”12 (Foucault, 1982). In this is the proposed transformation of the form but 
not the process previously deployed by clerics and now taken up by the 
disciplines. Power is considered here to be productive, polyvalent, and 
expressed in social interaction (Foucault, 1976). 
 
With this in mind the professional approach taken up can have important 
implications for the outcome. Psy-encounters can be considered sites of 
contested meaning. Nevertheless as an institutional mechanism the psy-
encounter can also be considered central to the procedures of discipline(s) i.e. 
the establishment of discourses and “regimes of truth” that are central to power-
knowledge relations (O’Farrell, 1996) and thus processes of subjectification. 
Foucault’s “discipline” of course is more appropriately, though most likely less 
commercially appealing, translated as “docile-utility”13. Regimes of truth14 
should not be considered attempts to formulate a relativistic construction of 
material reality, but instead attempts to question the way disciplines and 
institutional practices create, circulate and deploy knowledge(s) to privilege a 
specific version of reality (Foucault, 1982). Thus an examination of the 
relationship between power and knowledge (power-knowledge relations) is 
required. The psy-professions have a long history of attempting to create and 
monopolise technologies through psy-assessment tools (Danziger, 1997). The 
creation of not only a discourse of insight but also technologies used to objectify 
it can be seen as a continuation of this process and extends processes of 
subjectification both to the object of assessment and the subject deploying psy-
technologies. 
 
 
                                                        
12 For an extended discussion see p. 64. 
13 Translators note in Sheridan, A. (1995) edition of Foucault’s Discipline and 
punish: the birth of the prison. Penguin edition (pp. ix – xx). 
14 “régime du savoir” (Foucault, 1982) 
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4.4.3 Insight As Object In Subjectification 
The psy-encounter “manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as 
objects and the objectification of those who are subjected” (Foucault, 1975 p. 
184). Asymmetrical power relations are one way in which the conditions of 
possibility are created to make individuals into subjects, i.e. that they are 
controlled and/or dependent on the other and tied to the identity created in the 
encounter (Foucault, 1982). This implies a power that attempts, in part, to 
subjugate and make the individual subject to the process. In this way it is not 
the individual but facets of their subjectivity which become an object of the 
assessment.  
 
One means of subjugation within this model is the creation of discourses of 
“objectivity”. This becomes manifest in clinical discussions, for example, arising 
from MSE (Trzepacz & Baker, 1993) where the professional is seen an 
objective observer of reality and the patient as subjective. This has implications 
in terms of insight in mental health. Firstly it positions power in the professional 
to define the reality of the other as an objective truth. In so doing it leaves little 
room to contest authoritative accounts and limits the ability of the patient to 
engage in personally relevant and culturally concordant meaning making 
narratives. The use of “objective” in this way discredits the subjective 
experience of the patient.  
 
One might legitimately ask who can witness another and to what degree does 
witnessing actually mean seeing? (Derrida, 1994). In this light, it is possible that 
what clinicians see is a reflection of the theories they have about the world 
(May, Angel & Ellenberger, 1956). In terms of insight this is of critical 
importance. The object of the insight assessment is informed by the theoretical 
orientation of the clinician and drives the type and nature of insight discourses 
created (Marková, 2005). Therefore, it may be more appropriate to consider 
professional objectively as another form of subjectivity (Parker, 1989). A 
reflexive practitioner might interrogate the regimes of truth and power-
knowledge constellations invoked in clinical practice (Hedges, 2010). However, 
despite calls for the abandonment of this type “objective-subjective” positioning 
in mental health (Berridge, 2002), the practice persists. 
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Another important implication of the discourses of objectivity relates to 
constructions of an illness profile. In traditional medicine the symptom is 
considered to be a subjective experience relayed to the doctor and then 
mapped onto signs of disease that can be objectively tested using professional 
instruments (e.g. insulin blood level test). In mental health the symptom has 
become inverted and this link with signs has been broken (Boyle, 2002). This 
distances the method of psychiatry considerably from traditional medicine, but 
psychiatry continues to draw on this framework and apply it to mental health. In 
the absence of professional instruments to test for signs, the professional 
becomes the instrument. As the instrument the professional objectively reports 
the symptoms as if they were signs. There are at least two important 
implications of this. First the service users’ subjective experience (e.g. 
legitimacy to describe experience/symptoms) is discounted, thus creating the 
conditions of possibility for a devalued patient role that does not and cannot 
know themselves. Secondly, the professionals’ assumptions about the internal 
world of another and their experiences, positions them uncritically as the arbiter 
of reality. In both cases insight assessment becomes a mechanism by which 
the patient can be both objectified and subjugated. 
 
4.4.4 Models Of Madness 
As noted, the validity of the assessment of insight can be determined by the 
validity of the model of illness (Tranulis, Corin & Kirmayer, 2008). Traditional 
mental health models privilege biological, individualistic and Eurocentric 
theorising (Patel, 2003). However, there is a growing recognition of the need to 
augment this with relational, environmental and cultural factors (Dillon, 2011; 
van Os, Kenis & Rutten, 2011; Read, 2013). Despite the increasingly diverse 
theorising in mental health an extension of the dominant bio-medical ideologies 
has also gathered momentum (Hyman, 2010). Thus, bio-medicalism represents 
the lingua franca in theorising and practice. However, this is not the say that 
language is innocent (Andersen, 1996) nor that epistemology is neutral 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2013). Therefore, the way that mental health 
discourses are created and circulated has direct implications for available 
regimes of truth in this context. 
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An example of this can be drawn from the use of bio-medical language in the 
constructions of mental health in pharmaco-research trials. It is perhaps not 
surprising but it can serve to illuminate how bio-medical discourses of distress 
are used to frame research questions and potentially reinforce hegemonic 
theorising and practice. The results of a PsycINFO search are reported in 
Appendix B. While this is a crude measure, it suggests a subtle but pervasive 
structural bias in the terms and reference of published (and by proxy 
publishable) research “evidence”. The table shows, no reported pharmaco-
evidence was generated using the term “hearing voices” in comparison to the 
term “auditory hallucinations” and “schizophrenia”. The language of “hearing 
voices” is drawn from “survivor” discourses (Romme & Esher, 1993). Survivor 
and other anti-establishment narratives are selectively excluded from the 
generation of knowledge. 
 
In practice, mental health discourses of (ab)normality have been linked to the 
ideas of rationality and safety/risk and thus the need to control. Psychotic 
disorders specifically have been categorised as disorder of rationality (Roe & 
Davidson, 2005). The idea of rationality was important in early mechanisms of 
control and the creation of the asylum. However, more subtle discourses of 
rationality have been connected to mechanisms of power expressed in 
perpetual surveillance and the self-supervising subject (Foucault, 1967a). Thus 
adherence to a social norm becomes enforced through a myriad of 
interconnected social forces; every social actor becomes an agent of self and 
other surveillance. Thus dissent from a social norm becomes an act of 
irrationality against oneself and the community and is often associated with risk 
to oneself but also the community. Nevertheless, the state retains a functional 
role in this regard, and positioned psy-professionals as active agents in this 
enterprise through successive legislation (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). The most 
recent incarnation of this is the Mental Health Act (2007)15. 
 
 
                                                        
15 Mental Health Act (2007) section 3 which can be enacted for your health, 
your safety or for the protection of other people. Under s3 you can be detained 
and treated for up to 6 months. Consent for treatment is not required, but can 
be transferred to a Second Opinion Appointed Doctor after three months. 
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The connection of madness with risk became a powerful rationale for the 
continuation of control based treatment models. However, one must consider 
the advent of neuroleptic medication as an important development in 
deinstitutionalisation and legitimising models of control in the community 
(Moncrief, 2008). This type of theoretical orientation places the service user in 
the patient-position, in need of continuous assessment and patriarchal care 
packages. Adhering to this model means submitting to discourses of the self as 
pathological, dangerous, and incapable of making informed decisions about 
ones own needs. Furthermore, insight discourses can negate the validity of 
service users’ views and explanations of the distress. In this context, the 
rejection of the definition of madness by service users and by implication the 
rejection of the treatment can be challenging to the system. Not least to the 
professional positioned as a carer.  
 
Psy-professions’ evolution has been proposed to gain status and power through 
the ability to theorize and create models to control social deviance (Foucault, 
1976).  As such, positioning them as arbiters of difference as madness and 
functioning as state agents of social control (Szasz, 1972). Insight has been 
suggested to be a symptom of psychotic illness (Amador & David, 2004). Lack 
of insight has been of thought of as an important component of people with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia (WHO, 1973). Despite not being directly accounted 
for in ICD-10 or DSM-V, insight remains an important construct enabling 
services to position service users in relation to the constructs contained in these 
nosological frameworks. As such insight can be considered an important 
mechanism for directing and dictating models of care. 
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4.4.5 Language And Contested Social Spaces 
The psy-encounter can be considered a site of negotiate meaning (Antaki, 
Barnes & Leudar, 2005). However, it can also become a site where discourses 
and clinical practice promote institutional goals. Therefore, it is important to 
critically examine theory, research, and practices that sustain and entrench 
power in the healthcare sector (Patel, 2003). In his classic genealogy of 
madness, Foucault (1967a) recognised the shift from brute force expression of 
power to discourses that define “regimes of truth”. In this vein, explorations of 
how discourses are constructed, contested, and changed (Speed, 2011), can 
contribute to theorising and models of care. Thus, a critical exploration of 
constructions of madness that dominate current theory and practice is merited 
(Pilgrim, 2005). 
 
Insight is a concept that appears to persist in mental health practice (Perkins & 
Moodley, 1993). A number of theoretical models arising from realist and 
qualitative research paradigms and several measures developed from these 
that have been widely used are reported in the research literature (Marková, 
2005; Chakraborty & Basu, 2010). The results from this research have 
produced inconsistence, and often contradictory, findings (Tranulis, Lepage & 
Malla, 2008). This has led to claims that hegemonic discourses of insight are 
culturally biased (Johnson & Orrell, 1995) and simplistic, damaging and 
confused (Beck-Sanders, 1998).  
 
However, some qualitative research has suggested that insight can be a more 
nuanced construct. It has been suggested that service users can develop rich 
and complex stories about themselves and their illness. Mizock, Russinova, & 
Chandrika-Millner (2014) have suggested that service users can accept they 
are unwell and reject diagnosis and professional constructions of their distress. 
Moreover, rather than being a fixed entity service users can think about insight 
as changeable, provisional and relational (Galasiński, 2010; Klausen et al., 
2013). 
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It has been suggested that insight is not used clinically in current practice (BPS, 
2014). However, recent research considered constructions of insight from 
service users perspective (Taylor, 2011) and by teams in review meetings 
(Goicoechea, 2013). It also been suggested that a greater understanding of 
clinician’s constructions of insight may usefully inform practice in mental health 
services (Hamilton & Roper, 2006). A recent study reported clinical 
psychologists constructions of mental health in the NHS (Lofgren, Hewitt & das 
Nair, 2014). They reported the psychologists manage stake and accountability 
in terms of helpfulness through integrating biological and psych-social 
discourses on mental health. It is interesting that helpfulness and hegemonic 
formulation of distress was key idea in this research. What is useful and who 
decides this “regime of truth” is an important, but perhaps often overlooked, 
question? 
 
Smail (2006) suggests that an orientation towards “outsight” rather “insight” 
might greatly advance our understanding of what is helpful and when, in adult 
mental health. This suggests that a demystification of the psy-professional 
technologies may lead to a genuine appraisal of what can be achieved in 
therapy. It calls for an orientation to the external social factors that impact on 
distress. This creates the potential of focusing on distal sources of distress as 
legitimate objects of intervention. This distinctly politicised formulation can 
include service level, community level, societal level, and/or ideological level 
interventions. Furthermore, it legitimises a critical analysis of the entire 
hegemonic field, which includes discursive and non-discursive practices (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 1985). 
 
Psychologist’s ability to adopt pragmatic and eclectic approaches to practice 
has been noted to emerge from a professional identity crisis in the 1960s and 
1970s (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). Goldie (1977) proposed that the three 
positions that psy-professionals can take within services are compliant, eclectic, 
or radically opposed. Each has implications for processes of subjectification in 
terms of possible alignment with, appropriation of, and rejection of hegemonic 
ideologies. More recently it has been suggested mental health teams implicitly 
endorse a complex range of theories and practices in psy-encounters 
(Colombo, Bendelow, Fulford & Williams, 2003).  
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It also been suggested that practitioners deploy a variety of strategies to work 
around bio-medical constructions of distress, including extending diagnostic 
categories to include personal information, colluding with clients to provide 
acceptable diagnosis to access services and/or actively deconstructing 
diagnostic labels in sessions, and ignoring state sanctioned interventions in 
favour of individually tailored interventions (Strong, Gaete, Sametband, French 
& Eeson, 2012). Thus it appears that there may be multiple ways of working in 
and around dominant ideas in systems. Each has a range of transformative 
potentials and limitations at service user, team and ideological level. 
 
4.5 Rationale 
This literature review briefly reviewed the historical development of the concept 
insight in mental health. A review of the contributions of psychoanalysis, 
cognitive, neuropsychology and narrative constructions of insight has facilitated 
a look at the divergent theorising that has been developed on this topic. Multiple 
models and assessment processes have also been developed and this has led 
to a whole industry of research into insight in mental health. Nevertheless, the 
results of this largely quantitative research enterprise can be said to be at best 
inconsistent (Tranulis, Lepage & Malla, 2008). This is perhaps, in part, a 
consequence of a lack of conceptual clarity.  
 
However, there appears to be convergence on a construction of insight linked 
closely to clinician concordance and adherence to bio-medical view of distress. 
Thus insight can be seen as part of power-knowledge constellations that 
privileges bio-medical constructions of distress. Bio-medicalism can be said to 
facing a number of challenges. One of which has emerged with the promotion 
of person-centred care approaches in the NHS, where there is a greater onus 
on collaborative care that is sensitive to service users’ voice and concern in the 
psy-encounter. Another, is a growing concern with the reliability and validity of 
western bio-medicalism’s nosology of mental health. Finally, the language used 
and knowledge(s) deployed problematise alternative constructions of distress 
(i.e. lack of insight). 
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Qualitative methods have been used to explore constructions of insight from 
service users (Taylor, 2011) and teams (Goicoechea, 2013). Team working 
presents considerable challenges where conflicting ideologies compete to 
establish “regime(s) of truth” to define practice. Psychologists have been noted 
to take up a variety of positions in teams both in support of and in resistance to 
hegemonic ideas. Thus, an exploration of clinical psychologists constructions of 
insight may add to the available research. This is particularly pertinent in light of 
policy agenda to promote and extend person-centred care (DH, 2013b) and the 
professional agenda to promote leadership roles for clinical psychology e.g. 
NWW16 (Lavender & Hope, 2007), 
 
This research will endeavour to explore to what extent clinical psychologists use 
insight or related concepts in their work? To what extent does the hegemonic 
construction of insight permeate this clinical work? By focusing on contested 
sites in the psy-encounter it may be possible to explore how insight is 
constructed by clinical psychologists and how this shapes their practice. 
 
4.6 Research Questions  
1. How do clinical psychologists construct the notion of insight and how 
does it inform clinical practice? 
2. What kind of subject positions these constructions makes available? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 New Ways of Working 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
The social constructionist position was applied to the design and analysis in this 
research will be outlined. This position enabled the researcher to elaborate an 
analytic process that incorporated elements of discursive psychology (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (Parker, 1992). I will 
outline why I have chosen this epistemology and method to address the 
research questions: 
1. How do clinical psychologists construct the notion of insight and how 
does it inform clinical practice? 
2. What kind of subject positions these constructions makes available? 
 
This section will also outline procedural elements of the project, attending to 
ethics, recruitment and participants, process of data collection, analysis, and 
reflexivity. Finally, I will consider the question of evaluative criteria and how 
these might apply to this research. 
 
5.1 Social Constructionism. 
The question of “the social constructionist position” alluded to above provides a 
starting point from where we can begin to think about this position and its 
implications in this context. “The” is a reference to one position, but it must be 
recognised that there is no one position but a collection of possible positions. 
While there are some overarching themes, there are also multiple and 
idiosyncratic constellations of ideas that can be drawn on. Thus, in each 
application a new formulation is required to make public what theory is being 
drawn on, what knowledge claims are possible from this and what are the limits 
to these claims. “The” here refers to the constellation applied to this research 
context.  
 
Social constructionism takes a critical stance on universal truths and rather than 
seeing these as fixed, considers them to be constituted by the activity and 
products of social exchange (Anderson, 2012). Therefore, social 
constructionism is concerned with the way ideas are generated and reproduced 
(Burr, 2003).  
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I have already outlined several different models that theorise insight. In so doing 
I have suggested that there is no one “insight” and that clinicians can deploy 
insight in different ways in practice. Thus, it is entirely consistent to propose 
insight as socially constructed and adopt this epistemology to explore how 
insight is deployed in mental health practice. 
 
The version of social constructionism deployed in this research will attempt to 
align itself with Gergen’s (1985) four assumptions: 
1. A critical stance to taken-for-granted knowledge 
2. Understandings of the world are specific to a cultural and socio-historical 
context 
3. Knowledge as constructed in social action rather than the product of 
objective observation 
4. Knowledge as negotiated and sustained by privileging certain social 
practices and excluding others. 
 
As such, this way of looking at knowledge generation does not privilege one 
truth over another, recognising that multiple equally valid versions are possible, 
but can describe how one truth can take up a privileged position over another. 
Thus social constructionism can be used to consider how power is generated in 
social actions to create regimes of truth in a reciprocal manner. This has been 
called “power-knowledge” relations (Foucault, 1975). As social constructionism 
proposes knowledge to be relative and bound by social action within a cultural 
and socio-historical context, one should also consider power in the same vein.  
 
From this standpoint power, knowledge, truth etc. can all be considered 
intangible “objects”. Thus social constructionism focuses on discourse as a 
medium through which people make sense of their world in social action and 
where these types of intangible objects are deployed. Discourse can be 
considered a system of statements about the world which make certain social 
practices and ways of ordering knowledge seem reasonable and others 
problematic (Parker, 1992). Foucault (1969) used the analogy of a “table top” 
upon which we arrange knowledge about the world. The table permits us to 
order a limited number of pieces of information that can be (re)organised in a 
limited number of ways thus enabling constructions of reality based on this. The 
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analogy legitimises an analysis of not only the pieces of information and their 
arrangement17 but also the ideological edifice itself in the form of the “table top”. 
Ideology, has been both the object and subject of much philosophical theorising 
à la Marx, Adorn, Althusser, Sloterdijk, Žižek etc. and even a brief review of 
these debates is beyond what is required here. However, ideology in the current 
context will refer to a system(s) of ideas, values, and believes that interact with 
social practices to explain a political order, sustain power asymmetries, and 
maintain group identities  (Chiapello & Fairclough & 2002). This interaction 
should not be seen as causal but mutually sustaining through a constellation of 
social practices and discourses. 
 
Social constructionism is also interested in the ways that discourses inform 
identity. However, I have already outlined the rationale for favouring a dynamic 
and contingent subject and thus subjectivity is preferred. It is particularly suited 
to explore how the subject can be transformed and extended but also limited in 
social interaction i.e. subjectification (for example see Appendix C)  
 
Social constructionism can be accused as relativism (Edwards, Ashmore & 
Potter, 1994). That is that knowledge, truth, morality are solely generated within 
a specific social and historical context and not universal. This can lead to a 
further charge of solipsism arising from the infinite possibility of meaning. 
However, the version of social constructionism applied here prefers contingency 
to relativism. In drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/2013) être/et18, I 
recognise the materiality of the lived experience talked about by people but also 
consider the description of, for example, “patient as lacking insight” to be 
drawing on specific social discourses (psy-professional as expert) and made 
available through social practice (the deduction of mental state based on the 
MSE) and so on. 
 
 
                                                        
17 For example CBT and psychoanalysis might both formulate anxiety with a 
service user, but by arranging different constellations of information 
(knowledge) they are enabling distinct types of social action (e.g. interventions 
based on behavioural experiments or working through inter-psychic conflict). 
18 to be/and 
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Social constructionism’s description of power asymmetries as intangible has 
been suggested to negate social action (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009). However, 
here one can consider the attempt to describe the hegemonic field and the 
strategic deployment of discursive resources and subject positions within this as 
creating the conditions of possibility for social action (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). 
However, this in itself runs perilously close to a description of agency. Again, 
rather than formulate about agency, with its latent reliance on the concept of the 
unitary rational subject (Venn, 1998), I will propose a subject that is dynamically 
constitutive of and constituted by discourses and processes of subjectification. 
This will be elaborated further in the following section. 
 
5.2 Discourse Analysis. 
There are two main branches of discourse analysis that propose different 
constructions of, and emphasis on, subjectivity i.e. discursive psychology and 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). I will briefly outline both and orientate 
towards an integrated approach proposed by Wetherell (1998) that is deployed 
in this context. 
5.2.1 Discursive Psychology 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) established discourse as an object of research 
within psychology. They proposed speech/text as the site of social action where 
participants manage stake, accountability and interest. This methodological 
approach focuses on rhetorical devices and interpretative repertoires in 
speech/text to consider how subject positions are deployed. Stake is managed 
locally by rhetorical devices19 i.e. patterns of language use that position 
statements as natural, reasonable and unproblematic (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
For example, “category entitlement” can be deployed to add legitimacy to an 
account based on drawing attention to specific group membership of the 
speaker (“as a doctor I think you have schizophrenia”). The “thinking” speaker 
references professional membership, which has the effect of transforming lay 
thinking to the status of professional medical opinion. 
 
                                                        
19 for list of rhetorical devices see Appendix D  
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Interpretative repertoires are collections of culturally familiar statements that are 
common sense ways of organising accountability and managing subject 
positions in social interaction (Wetherell, 1998). For example, service users’ 
attempts to counter the power of professional opinion in psy-encounters by 
drawing on “emotional doctor” repertoire i.e. a doctor that is emotionally 
invested in their judgements, thus de-legitimises “doctor” as rational and 
objective (Taylor, 2011).   
 
This attention on locally managed constructions of subject positions that are 
focused on the text has enabled discursive psychology to promote itself as 
rigorous and transparent. It also promotes the idea of the subject as constituting 
a version of reality through social action. However, this focus has also left it 
open to the criticism of failing to account for wider socio-political power relations 
(Wetherell, 1998). Thus it can be thought of as an adequate methodology to 
attend to discursive but not non-discursive practices. 
5.2.2 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Conversely, FDA theorises the subject constituted by discourse and draws on 
Foucauldian idea that there is little point describing discourse without attending 
to non-discursive practice (Foucault, 1967b). Thus, FDA posits that both 
discursive and non-discursive practices construct subjectivities, social relations, 
and systems of knowledge (Fairclough, 1992). It can be thought of as a 
collection of methodologies rather that a clearly defined research tool. However, 
Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) suggested there to be three dimensions 
that are commonly applied under the banner of FDA: 
1. genealogical and archaeological approach to current discourse 
2. examination of power and its functioning 
3. processes of subjectification that extend, transform and limit subjectivity  
 
Foucault’s writings are known for theorising power. Thompson (2003) suggests 
there are two main branches of this theorising: 
1. technologies of domination: e.g. docile-utility (Foucault, 1975) 
2. technologies of self: e.g. governmentality and pastoral power (Foucault, 
1978/1982) 
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However, it is the latter of these and the implications for subjectification that 
Foucault suggested in later writing to be of greater theoretical and practical 
importance (Foucault, 1975; 1982). 
 
FDA’s overt movement away from the interactional context in order to comment 
on wider non-discursive practices has led to charges of failing to attend to micro 
issues, lacking rigour and imposing intellectual preoccupations onto practice 
(Schegloff, 1997).  
5.2.3 Integrated Approach 
In keeping with a social constructionist epistemology it seems appropriate to 
propose a flexible approach to bridge the paradox that people are at once 
“masters and slaves of language” (Barthes, 1982). Wetherell (1998) suggests 
an integrative approach is possible that promotes a dialogue between 
discursive psychology and FDA. Considering people as both products and 
producers of discourse (Billig, 1991), this research attempts to create a dialogue 
between micro and macro levels. That is an iterative movement between micro 
subject positions and macro power-knowledge constellations. In this way the 
subject can be theorised through the processes of strategic social interaction 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), in which they are dynamically constituted and 
reconstituted through multiple overlapping and at times contradictory discursive 
practices (Davies & Harré, 1990).  
 
This approach enables an exploration of psychologist’s use of insight and 
related concepts in multiple ways in practice. It permits an analysis of how this 
talk is managed locally (as master/producers) but also how it is made possible 
(as slave/products).  
 
This bricolage perhaps runs the risk of lacking the subtlety of discursive 
psychology and the freedom of FDA. Nevertheless, it is epistemologically 
congruent with the être/et position previously outlined. It also moves away from 
dogmatic methodology in favour of a sensitivity to the research question(s) 
which in turn creates the conditions of possibility to theorise processes of 
polyvalent subjectification. The specific application of this approach in this 
context will be outlined below (section 5.5 Analysis). 
 
45 
5.3 Procedure. 
5.3.1 Ethical 
The University of East London Research Ethics Committee and the XX 
Foundation Trust (XXFT) R&D Committee gave ethical approval for this project 
(Appendix E & F). No issues emerged from this process. 
 
5.3.2 Recruitment 
The researcher used a purposeful sampling method i.e. the sample was 
targeted to meet the needs of the research question. The information sheet 
(Appendix G) was sent to local area psychology leads to be distributed among 
their staff. One lead requested a presentation at a team meeting and this was 
facilitated. Inclusion criteria specified only HPC registered clinical psychologists 
who have worked in NHS run adult mental health services for more than one 
year would be recruited. There are no specific age, gender, ethnicity, or 
religious restrictions or targets for recruitment. There was a specific attempt to 
recruit participants who worked in a variety of settings across adult mental 
service provision in XXFT. 
 
5.3.3 Participants 
Nine participants were interviewed in total. This has been deemed an 
appropriate sample to reach theoretical saturation i.e. no more themes are likely 
to emerge from further data collection (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). 
 
Of the nine participants, three were female; six male. They worked in a range of 
services including Assertive Outreach, CMHT, Secondary Care, Psychological 
Therapy Services, Acute Inpatient, Specialist Disorder Specific Services and 
Access Services. The psychologists had between one and over ten years 
experience working in adult mental health. They reported having a wide range 
of additional psychology experience including Learning Disability, 
Homelessness, Primary Care, Community Psychology and Health Psychology. 
The participants included psychologists across a number of pay bands; some 
held de facto management roles and others leadership positions in their teams. 
All were UK trained in a variety of centres in London and around the country. 
 
46 
5.4 Data Collection 
5.4.1 Interviews 
Interviews were chosen as the mode of data collection. Naturally occurring text 
and talk has been suggested to be important in both discursive psychology 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005) and discourse analysis (Willig, 2001). Nevertheless 
interviews were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, there have been 
suggestions that the construct “insight” is no longer used in adult mental health 
services (BPS, 2014). Therefore it is possible that by sampling naturalistic talk 
“insight” may not come up directly. Taylor (2011) suggests that service users 
are not aware of the term insight. However, Dillon (2011) proposes that service 
users can readily identify with clinical insight as defined by David (1990). It 
seems plausible that insight is used in some contexts but not in others. Thus 
interviews present an opportunity to explore if insight is used, when it’s used, 
and if other analogous terms are deployed in practice. 
 
A pilot interview was conducted with a clinical psychologist who met the 
inclusion criteria but did not work for XXFT. This was used to test all elements 
of the interview protocol. No major changes were incorporated into the study at 
that time and this data was not used in the analysis. 
 
Interviews took place in a number of NHS sites (except one that was conducted 
in UEL). All interviews followed a semi-structured interview schedule (Appendix 
H). All participants were required to complete a consent form (Appendix I). 
However, consent was deemed to be an active process throughout the 
interview process, and participants reserved the right to terminate the interview 
at any stage and withdraw their data up until the 31st March 2015. Each 
interview ended with a participant debrief. 
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5.4.2 Transcription 
Nine participants produced a total of 517 minutes of data (range 48-7620 
minutes; x  57.5 minutes). Interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed 
using a Jefferson-lite approach (Appendix J) adopted from Banister, Bunn, 
Burman et al. (2011). The full data set amounts to 8668 lines typed on MS Word 
for Mac 2011 and stored on XXFT sanctioned encrypted memory stick. 
 
5.5 Analysis 
The analysis looked at both subject positions and wider power-knowledge 
constellations in processes of subjectification. That is, how “insight talk” was 
deployed to extend, transform and limit subjectivity in the clinical contexts. 
Subjectivity of service users, colleagues and the clinicians themselves were 
considered. Claims and counter-claims made in the interviews were thought 
about in relation to discursive and non-discursive practices. 
 
In line with Wetherell (1998) the researcher attended to variability, interpretative 
repertoires, and ideological dilemmas raised and negotiated in the interviews. 
The research adopted a hermeneutic circle approach of reflexively reading and 
rereading the text in dialogue with theoretical ideas drawn from the literature on 
insight, subjectification and clinical psychology. Specifically four questions21 
guided the analysis: 
1. What is the object being talked about and how is this object identified? 
 The research considered how “insight talk” made possible “insight” as 
an object (focus) in practice. Is the object the insight of service users, 
colleagues, systems etc.? 
2. What new specifications of subjectivity are made possible in this talk? 
 Attention was paid to the ways in which participants talk transformed 
the subject i.e. as having/lacking insight. Consequently, what 
opportunities does this make possible for psychologists? 
 
 
                                                        
20 Interview 4 actually comprised of two interviews due to technical fault 
(24+52=76) 
21 Adopted from Foucault (1982) 
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3. What power-knowledge arrangements are drawn upon as discursive 
resources to promote positioning?  
 What ways are “truth” claims made and legitimised at the expense of 
others in psy-encounters? 
4. What devices or technologies are deployed to promote these power-
knowledge constellations?  
 What psy-technologies (e.g. assessment, formulation, etc.) are 
deployed in “insight talk”? 
 
The hermeneutic circle began at the point of collecting the first interview. Audio 
files were replayed to get a sense of the interview and reflexively think about 
the interview process and possible modifications. For example, in response to 
the second participant’s insistence that insight “is not used” in their service, the 
researcher adopted questions that attended not only to the concept “insight” but 
also directly asking about components of David’s (1990) insight: 
1. Acceptance of mental illness 
2. Compliance with prescribed treatment 
3. Ability to re-label unusual experiences as pathological 
 
The researcher transcribed all the interviews. Ideas, questions, and 
considerations were noted throughout which forms an audit trail of the 
hermeneutic process. During preliminary readings the researcher asked broad 
questions, e.g. “what is the text doing, and how is this being achieved?” (Willig, 
2008). Each reading was used to clarify extracts from the interviews that more 
directly addressed the research questions. While the entire text was coded to 
attend to variability, the write-up focused on extracts that more directly 
referenced the research questions. Subsequent readings focused on coding for 
rhetorical devices, variability, subject positions and ideological positions in text 
(see Appendix K-L). Throughout, the entire analysis the researcher engaged in 
additional theoretical literature in response to the data. 
 
The final component of the analysis involved the writing. This necessarily 
involved a clarification of ideas that had up to this point been in note format. It 
also necessitated selecting some extracts at the expense of others.  
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5.6 Reflexivity 
Social constructionism posits multiple possible readings of reality, and thus 
rejects grand narratives or universal truths. Foucault (1969) noted that his own 
analysis was limited and deliberately so. Perhaps in somewhat analogous 
fashion, I am suggesting that my analysis is limited and necessarily so. In this 
sense as a researcher I should be at least somewhat aware of the problematic 
status of my own knowledge claims and the discourses used to create them 
(Willig, 2008). As a researcher taking a critical stance on what can be deemed 
to be a contested construct positions me in certain ways. Yet, within the 
interview process I was drawn to join with, contest, and be curious about 
participants’ accounts to try and make sense of what they were saying. This 
involved taking up various and often contradictory positions within the interviews 
to explore the extent and limits of these accounts. So as much as I have 
attempted to explore the subjectification processes in the interviews I have also 
attempted to interrogate what I am drawn to and avoiding in my theorising and 
thinking in order to contextualise the regime of truth that I am constructing 
(O’Farrell, 2005). 
 
5.7 Evaluation Criteria 
Rigour and coherence have been suggested to be hallmarks of good qualitative 
research (Yardley, 2008; Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 1999). Discourse analysis 
specific criteria have been proposed by Antaki, Billig, Edwards & Potter, (2003), 
who suggest attempting to avoid: 
1. under-analysis through summary or taking sides; 
2. under-analysis through over-quotation or through isolated quotation; 
3. the circular identification of discourses and mental constructs; 
4. false survey; 
5. analysis that consists in simply spotting features. 
 
However, it is worth noting that there is a growing industry producing ever more 
repetitions of ways of doing and ways of measuring qualitative methods. 
Foucault’s (1969) critique of scientific practice as just one set of codified 
relations between a precisely constructed knower and precisely constructed 
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object, with strict rules governing the formation of concepts is worth raising in 
light of this “turn to criteria” evident in qualitative research literature. No doubt 
these criteria provide useful guides to early career researchers. However, the 
research community may do well to notice the implications of fetishising these 
criteria and circling research practice around the words and ideas of a few 
discipline22 leaders to the detriment of alternative models. Indeed this research 
draws heavily on some of these people (e.g. Wetherell, Antaki etc.).  
 
As well as drawing on Antaki and co.’s shortcomings, the evaluative criteria 
applied here will draw on coherence, transparency and rigour, impact, and 
attention to researcher reflexivity (Yardley, 2008; Burman, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
22 Foucault’s “docile-utility” is noteworthy  
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6 ANALYSIS 
I will briefly review the analytic approach and structure of the analysis that will 
be organised into micro, meso, and macro politics of insight talk.  
 
Taking a social constructionist stance, I used a discourse analytic model that 
integrates the text and context to promote a dialogue between the subject and 
the social (Wetherell, 1998). Within this I acknowledge that, not only this 
reading but also, the whole process is constituted by and constitutive of my own 
historical and cultural context (Van Dijk, 2011). Indeed through positioning 
myself I am de facto creating the conditions of possibility for this reading which 
while methodically rigorous must be theoretically idiosyncratic. Therefore, I am 
not only suggesting, but advocating that one applies an “être/et” lens (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1980/2013) to the analysis. Therefore this is one, but not the only, 
possible reading of the data. 
 
The analysis is structured around the constructions of insight in adult mental 
health. Extracts are presented in sections to aid contextualisation and limit 
reductionism (Willig, 2003). MM refers to the interviewer and P refers to the 
participant (Appendix J). Each extract was considered in terms of 
1. what object is identified and constructed in the talk 
2. how is subjectivity created, resisted and/or transformed in this talk 
3. what power-knowledge constellations are recruited  
4. how does this affect subjectivity 
 
Extracts will be used to explore how rhetorical devices are deployed to manage 
accountability and stake (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Each transcript will illustrate 
a range of interpretative repertoires that are drawn on to achieve a variety of 
subject positions within the text. The subject positions will be linked to wider 
discourses that make possible power-knowledge constellations. 
 
Grounding the research in examples has been suggested to be an important 
evaluative criteria in qualitative research (Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 1999).  
However, the choice to use extracts of data rather than single line or isolated 
quotes has potential ramifications. Primarily the use of extracts could be 
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considered to limit the amount of different examples that are presented in the 
analysis.  However, as noted one must balance the charge of under analysis 
between the poles of over-quotation and isolated quotation (Antaki et al., 2003, 
see section 5.7). There are a number of reasons why extracts were favoured in 
an attempt to strike this balance.  
 
Firstly, as mentioned by Willig (2003) the reporting of extracts can be used as a 
means to contextualise the data. In line with the analytic focus (i.e. an 
integrated approach attending to micro and macro level constructions of 
insight), the use of extracts enables an exploration of the research themes in a 
wider discursive context. Secondly, reporting extracts can promote, what 
Yardley (2008) refers to as, “sensitivity to context”. That is, an attempt to 
account for inconsistencies and complexity in participants’ accounts. By 
presenting extracts one can expose and explore the inconsistencies in 
participants’ accounts and in so doing enable an analysis of the movement 
between subject positions within accounts. Therefore, extracts are not only 
desirable but vital to consider how participants take up various, and often 
inconsistent, subject positions in their accounts. Finally, I will briefly consider the 
use of extracts in terms of rigour and transparency (evaluative criteria returned 
to section 7.3.2). The extracts presented broadly account for the ways in which 
clinicians talk about insight in their practice. Nevertheless several decisions 
were required to move from the entire data set to a set of reported extracts. The 
audit trail to account for this process has been summarised in Appendix K-L and 
is a way of “making public” these decisions. Furthermore, I have sought to be 
transparent in all aspects of the method and the epistemological position taken 
up in this research. Specifically, in outlining my social constructionist position, I 
have proposed the être/et stance (p. 41). Thus, one should not see the extracts 
as representing the truth or one definitive explanation. But rather, one might 
consider the extracts to represent one, of many possible, readings of the data. 
 
I have decided to order the analysis from micro to marco level. This was done in 
the interest of parsimony and is not intended to suggest a movement in either 
direction or that they are separate spheres in any way. More over at each point I 
will attempt to relate to discursive and non-discursive practices in a dialectical 
fashion, each constituted by and constitutive of the other (Van Dijk, 2011).  
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6.1 Micro-politics 
Micro-politics is an attempt to consider local constructions when the object of 
insight is the conceptualisation of insight of the clinician themselves and its 
application in the most proximal sense. That is a construction of insight as 
deployed in their speech about their own ideas and application directly in 
service user contact. As noted, this slightly arbitrary demarcation is not meant to 
delineate the extent of the discursive resources deployed in this domain. Thus, 
while the object remains centred on micro-politics of self, the discursive 
resources deployed, maintained and resisted are wide and varied. 
For example, the psychologists interviewed drew on systemic discourses, 
positivism, and humanism while constructing insight in this proximal sense.  
 
The majority of participants suggest insight to be of limited value, a product of 
psychiatric discourse and theorising, and a concept that was either used more 
in the past or is used by other teams. All of the participants could readily cite the 
basic tenets of psychiatric insight i.e. compliance with treatment and 
acceptance of team conceptualisation of their distress. However, their 
constructions are often made possible by drawing on similar discursive 
resources that support the psychiatric construct. Possible effects of this will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
Micro-politics will look at insight discourses in terms of “insight as a psy-model”, 
“narrative insight”, and “formulation”. This section will draw on governmentality, 
i.e. modes of instruction, dissemination and enforcement of specific 
institutionally sanctioned ideas (Foucault, 1978/2002). It will also focus on the 
dynamics of power reproduction/re-production (Hollway, 1998). The former 
considers discursive and non-discursive practices that reproduce existing ideas 
and a conformist tendency. The latter, is proposed as enabling novel productive 
and transformational potential for subjectivity, which is considered to have a 
more radicalising tendency. 
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6.1.1 Insight As A Psy-Model 
Insight was constructed in relation to analogous psychological models. 
However, while the mainstream psychiatric constructs are inextricably linked to 
pathology; psychological theories are often assumed to describe universal 
human characteristics that can then be applied to psychopathology. Moreover 
psychology broadly and clinical psychologically specifically has been suggested 
to historically co-opt, adopt and extend existing theories rather than create new 
ones (Danziger, 1997; Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). Insight talk and psy-models 
are suggested to be sites of co-option, adoption and extension and thus 
exemplars of “power reproduction/re-production”. This has implications for 
processes of subjectification deployed in speech. 
 
(5009-5022) 
MM so, I guess wh::-, when you use the word insight, what you mean by that, 
what does that mean to you? 
P6 it's interesting, I, I thought a lot eh, I did Google ‘cause I've never had an 
insight lecture in training and then I thought, oh that's interesting actually 
everything we do is insight, that might be why, it's like empathy it's the 
same as empathy ((MM: mhm)) it's an awareness of what's around you 
in the here and the now, what’s around you during the day, what 
happened before, wh::-, what's happening ((2)) i::t’s mentalising, 
metacognition, {BR} I, I kind of thought it appears in everything 
MM yeah 
P6 but I suppose what's my sense of insight? {BR} em::, it’s really interesting 
because em, eh, {BR} phe:: it's, it's, it's so subjective in some ways what 
it is, eh, one could argue that insight is about knowledge and the more 
you know the more you can see it. 
 
 
There are a number of discursive strategies deployed in this extract. Firstly, one 
might consider the generality in the talk to be consistent with the rhetorical 
device systematic vagueness (Edwards & Potter, 1992). This has the effect of 
providing enough information for general impression to be made, but not 
enough to enable the ideas presented to be contested. Indeed the movement 
between contradictory positions mitigates potential conflict. 
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The psychologist notes that they’ve “never had an insight lecture in training”. 
Nevertheless, they go on to connect lay description (“empathy” and 
“awareness”) with technical professional language (“mentalising, 
metacognition”). This can be considered one site of “reproduction/re-production 
power”. 
 
Empathy and awareness are traits related to, but not monopolised by, 
professional clinical psychology. Thus their deployment here, suggests a re-
production potential of insight beyond the psy-encounter, which de-legitimises 
professional involvement. This creates the potential for novel lay 
understandings about what insight can mean and thus novel power relations 
between object(s) and subjects in psy-encounters. 
 
By contrast mentalising and metacognition can be thought of as attempts to 
reproduces existing power relations. Mentalisation is a model that suggests 
people’s innate ability to understand the mental state of oneself and others 
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). While metacognition is a related 
model that stresses the importance of the ability to think about thinking 
(Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010). Both theories are essentialist and draw on the 
Humanist idea of the unitary rational subject as an object of psychological 
theorising and intervention (Venn, 1998). Their recruitment constructs insight as 
a cognitive construct and thus a legitimate object of psychological theorising 
and assessment. Furthermore, as a cognitive construct, insight linked to 
rationality has implications for those deemed to have/lack insight in the psy-
encounter. This can be considered reproductive power, in that lay 
understandings are subsumed into professional theoretical constructs, and in so 
doing attempts to replicate existing power asymmetries.  
 
One thread that links across multiple constructions of insight is the idea of self-
knowledge as important to gain from therapy. This extract links insight to 
“knowledge and the more you know the more you can see it”. This interestingly 
presents self-knowledge as malleable, potentially cultivatable, and thus a 
legitimate object of intervention by professionals. In the creation of this object, 
psychologists can be positioned as experts in this field. One can see traces of 
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the Humanist project in this line of thinking i.e. the ideal individual has a core 
self that can be realised through personal pursuits.  
 
However, this construction places limits on scope of this knowledge too. 
Invoking the “more you know the more ..” calls for an objectification of the 
subject, who in turn becomes subjected to this construct of self (Foucault, 
1975). It also suggests that capacity for growth is an essential part of the 
process. On the one hand it suggests that both the language and technology for 
accessing and developing self-knowledge is part of psychology’s repertoire and 
on the other a tacit recognition that the layperson must display some of this in 
order to access “more”. Yet, this is tempered somewhat by the description of 
insight as “subjective”; this importantly positions the object “insight’ outside of 
the positivist frame and suggests limits to the claims one can make about 
insight and/or the self-knowledge that others hold about themselves and their 
experiences. Here again the psychologist moves between legitimising and de-
legitimising positions; between controlling and giving away psychological 
knowledge. This has practical implications in terms of making insight 
judgements in terms of what a clinician can claim about a service user, what a 
service user can claim for themselves, and whose claims are privileged.   
 
The tendency to simultaneously give away and hold onto the professional 
language and modus operandi of psychology has been noted previous (Rapley 
& Miller, 2003). This is raised in several interviews by connecting self-
knowledge to the ability to access and gain benefit from services. This could be 
read as an expression of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). That is a set of social 
assets and skills that enable social mobility and/or access to circumscribed 
social contexts. Cultural capital can be linked to statement “(the) more you know 
the more ..” Throughout the interviews, access to therapy was linked to insight 
of self in terms of e.g. “willingness and ability” (P2), “responsibility” (P4), 
“suitability and readiness” (P5), and “the frame” (P9). Like self-knowledge these 
constructs can be considered essentialist and yet problematic as signifiers 
without signified (Žižek, 2006). More critically as a reflection of the Humanist 
subject they can be said to embody a bourgeois individualism (Venn, 1998). 
That is, a knowing rational self, with recourse to the discourses of psy-
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professionals and western Humanism is privileged over other forms of self-
knowledge e.g. mystic/spiritual narratives. 
 
6.1.2 Narrative Insight 
All of the psychologists interviewed described the importance of understanding 
the service users’ views of their distress. This is perhaps not surprising in some 
ways given the nature of professional training that promotes the use of multi-
theory, person-centred approach of people’s distress. Person-centred here 
refers to a wider movement within healthcare provision (Darzi, 2008; DH 2013a; 
Goodrich & Cornwall, 2008). This movement in mental health perhaps owes its 
origins, in part, to the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Pilgrim 
& Treacher, 1992) and an orientation to community care and de-
institutionalisation promoted in subsequent decades (Warner, 2005), and the 
service user movement of more recent times (Campbell, 2005; Dillon, 2011).  
 
The person-centred approach has been directly formulated for adult mental 
health. Interestingly, two papers calling for the implementation of person-
centred model of care in psychiatric nursing (DH, 2006) and psychiatry (DH, 
2005) failed to propose a definition of what this means. NICE (2011) forwards a 
definition that privileges service users’ needs, preferences, and strengths to 
establish care based on informed decision-making and a partnership approach. 
However, NICE also includes a qualification based on capacity legally 
enshrined in the Mental Capacity Act (2005). Thus, the state sanctioned 
definition is linked to the dominant construction of rationality and madness. This 
power-knowledge constellation privileges psy-profession’s meaning-making 
regime in terms of a rational subject and thus their “insight”. This in turn has 
implications for the extent of the “partnership” possible in this context. The 
deployment of person-centred approach can be seen as an expression of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1978/2002). 
 
However, as mentioned in the introduction this idea has also begun to be 
theorised in the insight literature as narrative insight (Roe & Kravetz, 2003). 
Narrative insight suggests the importance for the service user to be able to 
articulate a story about their experience(s) and understand the consequences 
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of this way of storing their distress. Of note is an extension of the idea of cultural 
capital discursive resource proposed previously. While service user narratives 
are canvased, those expressed within professionally available theories can be 
given more legitimacy. The extension of these theories, to include “spiritual” 
explanations has implications for available discursive resources and processes 
of subjectification. Thus, here again we can see the dynamics of power 
reproduction/re-production in the psychologists talk. 
 
(4189-4209) 
MM okay, can you, can you give me an example that might help me to 
understand how you might use it, and if, if in the same example has 
somebody else not, used it slightly differently, is that? 
P5 so:: I:: might be ((3)) eh, referred someone and someone might say “ well 
yeah they’re hm::” {BR} I often get referred people “yeah they need some 
insight work” 
MM okay 
P5 which, i:: often is they need to know it's schizophrenia:: and they need to 
take the medication:: ((MM; mhm)) em:: and I (()) I don't know what 
insight work is frankly, you know there isn't a therapy which is insight 
therapy ((MM; mhm)) and I think that oversimplifies a lot of what's going 
on in terms of somebody {BR} understanding that they have, some 
difficulties and what that's about ((MM; mhm)) em:: {LS} so if someone 
was referred, saying “oh, this person has:: yeah, needs to have more 
insight”, I suppose to me I’d:: be thinking:: and trying think about it 
outside just a medical explanatory model ((MM; mhm)), so thinking a bit 
about {BR} what do they, what is, {BR} what do they think is a problem? 
MM mhm 
P5 so do they acknowledge that there is a difficulty or not, and what do they 
think that's due to and it doesn't have to be something that necessarily 
has medical eh, cause according to them, so they could have you know, 
a level, they can have insight that there is a problem ((MM; mhm)) but 
they might put that down to em spiritual issues ((MM; mhm)) or {LS} em:: 
((3)) you know stress caused by something else, you know family 
difficulties, whatever, they might not see that necessarily, or trauma, they 
might not see that as “right, I have schizophrenia” per se. 
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The psychologist in this extract takes up the subject position as thoughtful multi-
theory practitioner; which can be compared to the construction of the referrer as 
reductionist in their understanding. Firstly they acknowledge the referrer’s 
request as a “reproduction” of David’s (1990) classic conceptualisation of insight 
i.e. the service user “know it’s schizophrenia” and that “they need to take their 
medication”. However, immediately a counterclaim is presented as this 
“oversimplifies a lot of what’s going on”. Both the oversimplification and request 
for insight work are linked to “medical explanatory model”. The effect is to 
position this model as less useful and thus those ascribing to it in a degraded 
subject position. The psychologist’s appraisal distances them from this and 
enables potential alternatives. 
 
The psychologist cements this shift by suggesting a movement away from 
reductionist theory to what the service user “think is a problem”. Here the 
psychologist is positioned a-theoretically and aligned with the service user 
views. However, one could see this position as made available by, and a 
reproduction of, the person-centred approach, a discursive resource strongly 
promoted within adult mental health. This position is further supported by two 
prominent explanatory models; one from service user discourses and the other 
from mainstream psychology. 
 
Firstly, drawing on “spiritual issues” the psychologist is positioned as thoughtful, 
critical and open to thinking of explanation outside of what could be seen as 
positivist medical model. The use of spiritual explanations for distress as an 
important part of people’s meaning making has been well documented (Romme 
& Escher, 1993, 2000; Peters, 2001). It could be seen as drawing from survivor 
and service user movements and presents as an alternative model resisting 
hegemonic pathologising and simplistic discourses made available through bio-
medicalism (Harper, 2004). Thus this could be seen as a process of “re-
production” enabling the possibility for transformed subjectivity and novel 
service user “insights” into their distress. 
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Secondly, the psychologist formulates “stress” as a potential explanatory factor. 
This could be considered an opposing position to the service user aligned 
position previously articulated. This is in turn supported by recourse to stress 
emerging from the professionally evidenced domains of “family issues” (Vaughn 
& Leff, 1976) and “trauma” (Read & Ross, 2003). Interestingly the use of a lay 
term “stress” prompts a “reproducing” of professional discourses, thus possible 
restrictions on subjectivity. Stress is often formulated through the diathesis-
stress model, which has been critiqued as standard biopsychosocial model that 
implies individual vulnerability and thus veiled bio-medicalism (Pilgrim, 2002). 
Thus, implicitly endorsing discourses and practices that privilege deficit based 
constructions may restrict access to other possible constructions e.g. strengths 
based (White & Epston, 1990) 
 
The recruitment of these discourses enables the psychologist to take up 
different and sometimes oppositional subject positions both aligned to and 
rejecting service user and bio-medical models of distress. Being able to take up 
both-and positions enables the psychologist to position themselves as 
mediators between the service user and medic (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992; Cole, 
Diamond & Keenan, 2013). In the process of canvasing service users’ views, 
psychology also attempts to organise, theorise and legitimise targets for 
intervention based on them. This is achieved by deploying the professional 
practice of formulation. 
6.1.3 Formulation  
Formulation has been suggested to be an important tool available to 
psychologists to help to organise and make sense of a person/systems’ 
presenting problems. So, while narrative insight in this context was linked to 
canvasing service users’ views; formulation is constructed as a psychology 
specific technology of ordering and systematising those views. 
 
Psychological formulations tend to make specific theory-practice links and 
attempt to move beyond descriptive and static conceptualisations (Johnstone & 
Dallos, 2013). Formulation can be considered a collaborative and active 
process of meaning making (Harper & Moss, 2003) and has been suggested to 
be a legitimate alternative to diagnosis (Kinderman & Tai, 2009). It has also 
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been afforded the status of an officially sanctioned technology of psychology 
when working in adult mental health (BPS, 2014). However, formulation is 
dependent on other available discursive and non-discursive practices to inform 
how it achieves its goals. Some of these might include the commission of work 
(i.e. the request of referrer/presenting problems) and the orientation of the 
clinician. It has been suggested that bio-psychosocial formulations that promote 
deficit discourses and de-politicise distress are repackaged bio-medicalism 
(Pilgrim, 2002; Read, 2005). Thus the suggestion that it can be a viable 
alternative to diagnosis is dependant on the variety and legitimacy of theories 
recruited to support its use. In this way formulation as a technology also reflects 
a dimension of power reproduction/re-production dynamics in adult mental 
health.    
 
Formulation as a technology was recruited throughout the interviews as an 
alternative to reductionist bio-medical language and explanations of distress. 
 
(365-383) 
MM Em, is that, is that a concept that you would use? 
P1 no 
MM no, and  
P1 {LG} 
MM and can you tell me about why that’s different then, what do you bring 
that’s different or how do you think about it, like in that example em, or in 
a recent example 
P1 Em, well I, I, Ii-, I, like the whole concept of insight I find particularly 
problematic, so it’s not a concept that I try to use at all, em and try to 
steer clear from it as much as possible, em, because I think its, it’s a very 
complicated idea, which is never em, is frequently used but rarely 
defined 
MM mhm 
P1 em, and there’s always sort of an assumption that we all know what we 
are talking about, when we talk about insight when actually I have a 
suspicion that we are all talking about quite different things {LG} 
MM mhm 
 
62 
P1 {LG}, so that’s why I kind of steer clear of it, but it, it is a term, you know, 
it is one of those terms that’s widely used in mental health services and 
its, it’s an easy to reach for phrase too, which, which, seems to explain 
something but in reality doesn’t really explain anything 
MM yeah 
P1 so, I would, I would try and formulate what’s really going on for the 
person, and try, and try, and understand why that might be impacting on 
the person’s engagement 
 
The psychologist begins by rejecting “insight” as “problematic”. They go on to 
notice an inherent tension in all communication i.e. the tension between 
intended and inferred meaning (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001). This idea is 
supported by reporting insight as “frequently used but rarely defined” and that it 
“doesn’t really explain anything”. The psychologist deploys the words “actually”, 
“reality” and “really” to emphasise the lack of clarity. This is contrasted with the 
use of profession specific technology that enables the psychologist to 
“formulate what’s really going on for the person”. The rhetorical device of 
category entitlement enables the psychologist to manage stake here and gives 
weight to the privileging of formulation as reality defining tool (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). 
 
By highlighting “insight” as problematic; psychology’s tool formulation is 
considered the antidote to ill defined constructs e.g. insight. The psychologist 
also uses formulation as a vehicle to understand the service user and move 
beyond the “easy to reach for”. Thus the psychologist is again positioned as a 
thoughtful practitioner that attempts to join with and understand the service user 
as oppose to label them. This suggests formulation as a tool of power re-
production creating conditions of possibility for “thick” descriptions (Geertz, 
1973) of service users insight, distress, engagement etc.    
 
However, the psychologist’s statement “understand why that might be impacting 
on the person’s engagement” is important. It draws us to the “reproducing” 
potential of formulation. The referral for “lack of insight” was often presented in 
the context of non-engagement. In this sense, the production of thick 
descriptions can make available more thoughtful understanding of service 
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users’ positions and/or more sophisticated modes of coercion. As such, 
formulation might start as a collaborative meaning-making enterprise but could 
be utilised by others to achieve different ends. I am not suggesting that this was 
the case in the interviews but highlighting the transformative potential of 
formulation that re-produces thick descriptions and/or reproduce “easy to reach 
for” models to manage complexity. 
 
6.2 Meso-politics 
Meso-politics considers constructions of insight at the level of team interactions. 
I will specifically draw out two common threads in the psychologists’ 
constructions of insight, namely the constructions of their colleagues as objects 
of insight and the negotiation of subjectivities in contested social spaces. Both 
will be linked to processes of pastoral power and disciplinary power. 
 
The psychologists interviewed tended to use “insight talk” (during referral 
meetings and/or team discussions) as an opportunity to deconstruct the notion 
of insight and help foster ostensibly more complex and thoughtful 
reconstructions of service user distress. However, this is accomplished through 
the construction of their colleagues as an object of insight assessment. This will 
considered as part of the broader discourse in clinical psychology to foster 
psychologically-minded services and will be used to introduce pastoral power. 
 
Foucault (1982) described pastoral power as a process of promoting the 
transformation of the subjectivity of others. In relation to insight, this will be 
adopted as follows: 
 Salvation orientated – the promotion of psychological mindedness as a 
transformative discursive resource in mental health 
 Oblative – psychologists’ positioning within teams to strategically 
promote pragmatic conceptualisation and team formulations about 
insight 
 Totalizing – the extension of psychologists’ responsibility beyond service 
users to the whole team/system 
 Specialist – psychological mindedness as a unique meaning making 
ideology with applicability at every level.  
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Secondly the psychologists recognise the challenges of promoting alternative 
views and ideologies within what are largely considered to be medically 
dominated mental health services (Speed, 2011). An analysis of contested 
social spaces will be used to introduce disciplinary power (Foucault, 1975). That 
is the ways in which discipline related discursive and non-discursive practices 
attempt to regulate social activity. In this sense the principle disciplinary 
ideologies compete for and influence processes of subjectification. For 
example, “disciplines” of psychiatry and survivor movement can ascribe the 
label “schizophrenic” or “voice hearer” to a person, who might be further 
labelled “patient” or “service user”. Each labelling process has multiple 
competing conditions of possibility and limitations for the subject.   
 
In the interviews the psychologists take up a variety of subject positions to 
acquiesce to and resist bio-medicalism in this sector. The positions described 
should be considered radically contingent, with the social actors recruiting 
multiple subject positions and selectively, but contingently, forging alliances to 
resist dominant ideologies (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This radical contingency 
can be seen as a sophisticated strategy, that requires selectively maintaining 
and resisting a number of power-knowledge constellations. A task that requires 
continued and reflexive analysis of power and relationships at this meso-level. 
For example, a psychologist might draw on DSM-V categories in order to refute 
a diagnosis with the ultimate goal of promoting an alternative construction of 
distress. However, within this the psychologist is also possibly drawing on 
discourses than enable psychologists to deploy team formulation skills (Onyett, 
2007) and ideas around strategic systems change23 (Bateson, 1972). 
Furthermore, psychologists have been promoted as experts in team working, 
consultation and leadership (Lavender & Hope, 2007) and therefore 
psychologists working at the meso-level can also be seen to reflect wider 
political discourses. 
 
 
 
                                                        
23 “the difference that makes the difference” 
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6.2.1 Objectifying Colleagues Insight 
All but one of the psychologists talked about either being referred people for 
“insight work” or being involved in team discussions in which a service users’ 
insight was the central object of that assessment. This section deals with a 
tendency to invert the assessment focus and construct their colleagues as an 
object of insight. Thus, making possible new sites of subjectification. 
 
(5226-5255)  
P6 well, its inter:: it interesting because we don’t give those labels although 
we’re encou:: we, we’re going to do SCID24 training and, and I do think 
psychologists, we’ve got a lot of expertise, we should be key in whose 
deciding who’s what 
MM mhm 
P6 but often in secondary care, you get the name of the person and the 
diagnosis, it’s already spelled-out 
MM right 
P6 it’s already {BR} categorised 
MM right right 
P6 and largely they fit a, a pattern of relating, a borderline em:: ((MM: mhm)) 
but then em:: ((2)) but eh  wh-wha::, this is the system we’re in, this is the 
thing:: if it was a different, if it was more formulation, a biopsychosocial 
model 
MM yeah 
P6 {BR} we wouldn't ha:: staff would understand actually it's their way of 
relat-, relating is:: key in the intervention 
MM yeah 
P6 it's not just giving a drug and making sure they take that’s key ((MM: right 
okay)) it’s how we are were with people 
MM yeah and is that why then you say that em, it's personality, psychosis is a 
bit more black-and-white but personality is, is a bit more  
P6 because it's relat- (()),  
MM  complex 
                                                        
24 Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
2012). 
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P6 because I think eh, eh people have to look at themselves and 
understand their own transferences, and have insight into themselves 
or::  
 
This account can be thought of as two sections both describing tensions 
encountered in accepting a referral for a problematized service user. One could 
consider this extract as pivoting on the phrase “bio-psychosocial model”. In the 
initial section psychologist takes up an expert subject position from where they 
can contest existing disciplinary power-knowledge arrangements; in the second 
section colleagues are constructed as an object of insight assessment and thus 
subject to pastoral power processes.  
  
The psychologist appears to vacillate between positions as they try to negotiate, 
resist and reframe the imposition of the service users difficulties that has been 
decided a priori. Initially the psychologist rejects the use of diagnostic 
categories in “we don’t give those labels”. From what could be considered a 
devalued role the psychologist responds by deploying the rhetorical device of 
category entitlement (Edwards & Potter, 1992). As a psychologists “we’ve got a 
lot of expertise” and should be involved in “deciding who’s what”. The use of 
“we” promotes agreement with the interviewer (consensus device – Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). This position of expertise is further consolidated by citing training 
in SCID. This expert subject position gives weight to the remaining statements. 
 
The psychologists then appears to vacillate once more, appearing to acquiesce 
to the existing power-knowledge constellation by stating “this is the system 
we’re in, this is the thing”. Within this is a subtle critique of the system. Žižek 
(2006) proposes a Hegelian negation in tautology contains a radical violence. 
For example the law is the law, or in this case the system is the system. The 
primary clause “the system” which divides roles and responsibilities between 
professions in mental health holds medics responsible for diagnosis. However, 
this is now negated by the second clause. The second “system”, the alternative 
system is the one guided by “more formulation, a bio-psychosocial model”. 
However, this is also set against the psychologist previous statements, which 
suggests they are also poised to take up a more diagnostics role in this system 
– using expertise and SCID in “deciding who’s what”. Thus, the psychologist’s 
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resistance of existing disciplinary power arrangement has enabled the 
conditions for an extension and transformation of their existing expertise to 
include a bio-psychosocial diagnostician. 
 
This transformed and extended subjectivity guides the rest of the extract. The 
psychologist focuses primarily on the insight of colleagues as the object and a 
site to promote psychologically minded workforce. What is interesting is the 
positioning of “relating”, “how we are with people” and ability to “look at 
themselves and understand” as key tools in the intervention. The psychologist 
connects these human qualities to a specific technology of psychology i.e. 
“transference”. In so doing they formulate the everyday within a psychological 
framework. Deleuze and Guattari, (1980/2013) suggest that the presence of a 
discourse is always imperialist and despotic – colonising and subjugating the 
other possibility and limiting gnosiology25, epistemology, and ontology. In this 
case the totalising effect of linking the personal and professional could be seen 
in this light. This formulation of staff as a whole to transform them to 
“understand actually” and “have insight into themselves” can be considered 
dimensions of pastoral power in the promoting of ideology of a psychologically 
minded workforce.  
The extension and transformation of clinical psychology within mental health 
can be seen to part of wider processes of establishment of the professional 
within an already dominated hegemonic space. This has meant that UK based 
mental health service provision has historically developed as a site of contested 
meaning where professional extension by one faction can be perceived as 
threatening by another (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). For example, the extension 
of clinical psychology can be seen as threatening to psychiatry; similarly the 
extension of IAPT can be seen as threatening to clinical psychology. Some 
elements of this tension will be explored in the following section. 
 
 
                                                        
25 Gnosiology refers to an 18th century philosophy of knowledge when linked to 
aesthetics but also is linked to mystical or spiritual knowledge. The more 
modern homonym “nosology” referring to the classification of diseases may 
have been the intended translation. Nevertheless the former is retained to 
emphasise potential subjectification beyond psy-professional discourses.  
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6.2.2 Negotiating Subjectivity In Contested Social Space. 
Psychologists working in adult mental health have been suggested to be the 
“magician’s assistant” (Coles, Diamond & Keenan, 2013). This refers 
specifically to psychologists’ use of individualising talking therapies that 
implicitly endorse depoliticised and decontextualized constructions of distress.  
In this way psychologists’ orientation, models and methodologies are positioned 
as promoting and supporting the enterprise of bio-medicalism. However, one 
could also say there is a growing recognition of limitations of this model (Harper, 
2014; Kinderman & Tai, 2009; Read, Bentall & Fosse, 2009). Furthermore, the 
magician’s assistant idea, while seductive, may simplify the complexity of this 
social space. There has been increased interest in theorising the challenges of 
working in systems in which psychologists disagree (Boyle, 2013; Itten & 
Roberts, 2014; Speed, 2011). Psychologists have also been promoted as 
practitioners with broad theoretical knowledge and formulations skills that can 
be deployed to negotiate complex systems (Lake, 2008).  
 
The psychologists presented multiple instances of negotiating subjectivities in 
the context of contested ideas. The subject positions of strategic helping, 
pragmatist, and subversive will be discussed. 
6.2.2.1 Strategic helping position 
This psychologist’s talk enables them to take up a “strategic helper” position by 
drawing on multiple theoretical frameworks to promote meaning and join with 
colleagues. This joining with is made possible by formulating the potential for 
teams to problematize “helping” and by proxy the “helper”. The promoting of 
psychological formulations from a bio-psychosocial framework will be linked to 
mechanisms of pastoral power and implications for subjectification. 
 
(7643- 7668)  
MM what would you do with a referral, what would your response be? 
P8 when I first get the referral? 
MM yeah 
P8 I guess I would, would just think about with the person em ((3)) again 
what was going on, wh- j::ust asking a lot of questions about {BR} em, 
their, the persons background and context and why it might be important 
to them {BR} ((3)) the meaning of their beliefs, the, the kind of role that 
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maybe their presentation is playing in terms of protecting them from 
some other stuff that might be going on {BR} em, and I guess at the 
same time being very mindful that as a psychologist you don't want be 
seen as someone who was being kind of all woolly and not actually being 
very helpful and not {BR} em, not, and not agreeing with the team 
MM right 
P8 I think it's just about hold:: holding onto different ways of looking at stuff 
and validating just how difficult it is when someone is doing something 
risky and you're worried about them and they can’t see that this is 
something that is causing them problems, that’s really difficult, eh totally 
acknowledging  
MM mhm 
P8 {BR} that but then also trying to get behind why, {BR} em why is it is 
happening now, what's going on, wh::- what is this behaviour, is this 
protecting them, are those grandiose ideas actually helping them in some 
way right now because they feel terrible about themselves and if we’re 
say “no this is all mental health, this isn’t ((2)) “ what does that leave this 
person with 
 
The central concern of the psychologist is to resist being positioned as “all 
woolly” and “actually not being very helpful” by the team when presented with a 
referral about a service user who is deemed to lack insight. The presentation of 
psychologist as “all woolly” may reflect the positioning of the profession in 
general as a soft science in contrast the positivist, objective hard science of 
medicine. This is interestingly supported by the requirement to “agree(ing) with 
the team”. The linking of helpfulness and agreement is important. There have 
been several widely reported warnings of the perils of hierarchical systems that 
instil communal acquiescence (Janis, 1971; Kennedy, 2001; Francis, 2013). 
Despite this it appears that this tension still has the potential to exert pressure in 
clinical settings. Nevertheless, it can also be seen as a strategic manoeuvre 
deployed to negotiate complex systems and demonstrate understanding of the 
various perspectives articulated in multi-disciplinary teams. It also, potentially 
negates a legitimate confrontation by including multiple theoretical models and 
thus facilitates being able to take-up a “helper” role. 
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The psychologist draws on the person-centred approach to negotiate the 
aforementioned pressure. This also enables a formulation of the service user 
and team simultaneously. The positioning as person-centred practitioner in 
relation to the service user is supported by application of a bio-psychosocial 
formulation of the service user. This has the effect of providing a thick 
description to sit alongside the thin one already ascribed to the patient (Geertz, 
1973). They subsequently position themselves as person-centred in relation to 
their colleagues, by joining with and “validating” the experience of staff. In so 
doing they acknowledge the institutional privileging of “risk” and construct their 
colleagues as caring-professionals. This joining with can be seen as 
strategically important, as others can take up critique in this context as an attack 
on their professionalism and caring nature (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010). Finally 
they join with the ultimate meaning-makers in adult mental health i.e. psychiatry. 
By drawing on the psychiatric terminology (“grandiose ideas”) they suggest an 
alternative psychological formulation (“protecting them”) to sit alongside this and 
potentially create the possibility for an alternative narrative and extended 
subjectivity. The integration of competing theories in a systemic formulation 
enables them to negotiate the social space and respond “helpful[ly]”. 
 
Strong et al. (2012) suggest several strategies can be deployed by counsellors 
to resist DSM constructions in clinical practice. They noted that clinicians 
modified pathologising discourses with alternative descriptions of clients, similar 
to that produced by formulating in this extract. It is also somewhat related to 
Goldie’s (1977) eclectic position in which clinicians offer tentative opposition 
without instigating radical reform. This type of strategic helping may also reflect 
elements of the promotion of psychologically minded teams as previously 
mentioned. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/2013) note that epistemology is never innocent. In 
this context, the subject position “helper” requires an object to help. The 
promotion of psychological mindedness can be thought of as objectifying teams 
in this way. This can be seen a reflection of pastoral power where psychologists 
are presented as purveyors of specialists knowledge that has transformative 
potential for the whole community.    
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The use of formulation as a technology extends beyond promoting a 
construction of the reality of service users and systems for colleagues, to a 
technology of self-control i.e. the self-reflexive clinical psychologist. Self-
reflexivity can be thought of both “reflection in action” and “reflection on action” 
(Schon, 1987). This can enable possibilities and/or constraints on the subject 
and object of reflection, depending theoretical frameworks available e.g. 
person-centred, bio-psychosocial and bio-medical etc. Thus while clinical 
psychologists are promoted as self-reflexive practitioners (Hedges, 2010), this 
may also reflect broader processes of governmentality. As such, the “self-
reflexive psychologist” is simultaneously enabled and disabled by broader 
theoretical ideologies. This idea will be extended in the discussion section with 
reference to clinical psychology training. 
 
Finally, one could also consider the various and radically contingent social 
alignments as serving multiple strategic goals for the psychologist. The 
contingent nature enables a dynamic subjectivity that continually interacts, 
modifies and shapes the hegemonic field (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This is 
instructive in suggesting possibilities of on-going analysis of, and potential 
strategic response to, power asymmetries in practice. 
6.2.2.2 Pragmatist position 
Psychologists can apply multiple and, often, competing theoretical frameworks 
in adult mental health settings. Pragmatism, though not overtly alluded to, does 
provide an over-arching ideology that accounts for this discursive resource. 
Pragmatism is here considered to be a pluralist, critical, non-relativist, and 
action-orientated approach to theory and clinical practice (Cornish & Gillespie, 
2009). One could see pragmatic approaches in clinical psychology as apt in 
light of the professions continuous modification and transformation in response 
to changing theoretical, political and economic landscapes (Pilgrim & Treacher, 
1992). 
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(3966-3986) 
P4 these might not be delusional ideas, em, are ideas associated with 
insight, in other words paranoid schizophrenic, em, classically in the 
literature, in theory, has narratives about threats to them, which are very 
other focused, and eh, just involve conspiracies which may be 
associated with something that is special about an individual and which 
don't tend to focus on {BR} things eh:: things that, you know, the person 
has done for which might hold themselves responsible lead::ing to other 
people wanting to harm them 
MM mhm 
P4 whereas in this guys case he has a clear narrative about things he’s 
done that have upset other people {BR} and led them to want to harm 
him ((.)) even if he thinks that’s still wrong 
MM yeah 
P4 {BR} and in so doing, although I'm challenging the idea that he’s not 
insightful, I’m still actually, sort of, eh:: implicitly endorsing ideas of what 
a paranoid schizophrenic would be expected to do 
MM right, okay 
P4 eh:: how a paranoid schizophrenia impairs a person’s insight, I'm saying 
he doesn't fit that profile therefore maybe he's not paranoid 
schizophrenic or maybe doesn't lack of insight 
 
In this extract the psychologist recruits not only the hegemonic model (e.g. 
psychiatry) but also the epistemological frame, which supports it (e.g. positivism 
and logic) to construct an alternative version of the clinical problem. This is 
managed locally by recruiting the rhetorical devices, empiricist accounting 
(“classical literature”) and rhetoric of argument26 (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
 
By taking up a pragmatic position the psychologist can approach the local 
problem and present immediate but localised solutions. Aligning with and using 
psychiatric discourse to think about the clinical problem has the effect of not 
criticising the overall hegemonic structure and instead produces a contingent 
understanding as applied to this context. 
                                                        
26 the creation of a logical sequence of if-then statements that have the effect of 
rendering alternatives implausible 
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In terms of insight specifically the deconstruction of service users diagnostic 
label negates the practicality of a traditional insight discourse. Again, the 
psychologist sidesteps a collision with the dominant ideology and merely 
applied its own terms to question the validity of its application and outcome in 
this instance. The effect is not to challenge the discourse of diagnosis, but use 
its own terms to attempt to extend the subjectivity of the service user in this 
instance. However, the psychologist also provides an alternative – a service 
user “narrative”. This coherent narrative accounts for behaviour, causation and 
cognitions and thus the psychologist presents him as a rational subject. 
Recruiting service user views has been an important policy shift in the NHS 
(Coulter & Collins, 2011). Its deployment in this context can be seen as 
strategic. 
 
This extract might be thought about in terms of the compliant position and the 
eclectic position (Goldie, 1977). Eclectic in that the psychologist draws on 
competing theoretical frames to create the potential for expanded and 
transformed subjectivity in this instance. However, it is this localising and failure 
to overtly challenge the diagnostic discourse that permits an association with a 
compliant position. One might say that this eclectic-compliant tension is 
indicative of western liberal agenda that has sanitised dissent to point of 
promoting the faux-revolutionary i.e. a revolution without confrontation and thus 
radical endorsement of the status quo (Žižek, 2008). Nevertheless late 
Foucauldian interpretation of critical analysis promoted the possibility of 
systemic change from within (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; O’Farrell, 2005). In this 
sense psychologists can generate “niche(s) of resistance” alongside patients 
and staff to challenge hegemonic ideology. In this instance the psychologist 
suggests a collaboration with the service user has taken place27 to challenge 
the diagnosis and create this alternative narrative (Parker, 1999; Strong et al., 
2012). This narrative extends the subjectivity of the service user and the 
psychologist beyond pathologised/pathologiser into other domains e.g. 
meaning-maker/meaning-facilitator, albeit within a limited theoretical frame. 
 
                                                        
27 this is described in detail in another part of the transcript – see line 3461-
3504 Appendix M 
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This pragmatist approach simultaneously enables eclectic-compliant responses 
to disciplinary power-knowledge constellations. This could potentially lead to 
repetition of the status quo. However, this formulation assumes a static 
construction of power relations. Laclau and Mouffe (1986) suggest that the 
strategic alignment between not only social agents (e.g. service users) but also 
social discourses (e.g. bio-medicalism) can perturb the hegemonic field. Thus 
the continued strategic deployment of resources in this way results in small but 
inevitable shift in hegemonic discourses e.g. recruiting diagnostic modus 
operandi to negate its use and promote revised local practices. Diagnosis in 
mental health has proven remarkably resilient in the face of reasoned and 
rigorous critique (Boyle, 2002). Nevertheless taking up pragmatic subject 
positions can enable psychologists to engage in practice-based and localised 
innovations. 
6.2.2.3 Subversive position 
Some of the psychologists positioned themselves as subversive. That is, 
accepting an insight referral but using the therapeutic space as a non-discursive 
resource to construct an alternative focus for the work (Strong et al., 2012). 
Thus the subversive position creates the possibility to resist disciplinary power-
knowledge constellations and offer transformative potential for subjectivity. The 
protected nature of the therapeutic space and the availability of collaborative-
therapist discursive resource contribute to this process.  
 
(613-632) 
P1 we do get some referrals saying you know, “this person has no insight 
can you, can you help them gain insight” em, so we kind of get those 
referrals, em, and I think, think about it, often I suspect what happens in 
those cases is that we, in the psychology team, will then go off and do 
some work with that person if they’re, if they’re interested and willing to 
do some work. 
MM mhm 
P1 and, and then there probably isn’t that much interaction with the care 
coordinator about this perceived lack of insight and what is or isn’t going 
on, em, but actually what we’ll be doing with that person, wont, wont, 
wont be trying, you know, to convince them that they’ve got a mental 
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illness, of course it will be something that they, as a person, are 
interested in doing. 
MM mhm 
P1 and sometimes that may be around understandings of their difficulties 
MM yeah 
P1 and whatever that is, but then, I wouldn’t be using the term insight, so 
MM Ok 
P1 the, the, {BR} the nature of that discussion would be quiet different to I 
think what perhaps the referrer was expecting it to be. 
 
Here the psychologist’s talk constructs actual and potential subversive activity. 
However, it might be considered a strategy bridging the eclectic and radically 
opposed positions proposed by Goldie (1977). The hegemonic model of insight 
is presented in the form of the referral but resisted in the therapeutic practice 
engaged in. The hegemonic discursive resource of insight as a legitimate 
intervention target is articulated in “this person has no insight” but resisted by 
drawing on the collaborative-therapist resource. What the service-user “is 
interested in doing” is a powerful bottom-up redefinition of the referral.  
 
In this instance, the psychologist does not overtly ask the referrer to clarify what 
they mean by insight. It is implied in the subversive response. The psychologist 
links the referrers request “this person has no insight” to “convince them that 
they’ve got a mental illness”. Messari and Hallam (2003) noted service users 
experience of therapy (CBT for psychosis) as an invitation to persuade under 
the auspices of pedagogy. This is one example of the “magician’s assistant” 
critique outlined earlier and can be seen to reflect coercive rather than 
collaborative approach. However, the psychologist distances themselves from 
this coercive potential with a disclaimer (“but actually”) and draws the 
researcher into collaborating (“of course”) with the alternative (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). 
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The collaborative potential is realised by rejecting the referrer’s request and 
taking up the person-centred position. Thus engaging in “something that they, 
as a person, are interested in doing” creates the platform for a transformed and 
extended subjectivity. From here “understanding of their difficulties” can be 
constructed from the service user perspective again drawing on the relative 
importance of a narrative approach in psychologists’ talk. 
 
The potential for on-going subversion is realised in the notion that the work is 
conducted without systemic surveillance of the psychologist. It is noted that 
there is little interaction between psychologist and referrer about the 
commission of work i.e. lack of insight. Also, that therapeutic “discussion would 
be quiet different” to what was expected in absence of surveillance creates 
considerable potential for subversive activity. 
 
The psychologists interviewed privileged the relationship with their colleagues 
and thus on-going monitoring of the work may not be common in the light of 
positive relationship with and valence on the work of psychology. Nevertheless, 
it may become increasingly difficult to work outside of the commission of work in 
adult mental health with the impending implementation of payment by results 
(Cohen-Tovée, 2012) and increased institutional pressure on clinicians to 
record and account for their clinical time on electronic record systems (e.g. 
RiO). The model of clustering may also lead to a prescription type approach to 
interventions and an increased focus on evidenced and state sanctioned 
interventions à la NICE28 guidance. However, clinical documentation can be 
deployed as therapeutic documentation with subversive potential. It can be 
used to re-author, reformulate, and challenge existing narratives (Madsen, 
2007) held at the meso-level about service user. If deployed in this way, it can 
promote psychological ideas and extend service user voices beyond the 
therapeutic room.  
 
As noted, psychologists are uniquely positioned to acknowledge hegemonic 
models of distress and join with service users in the therapeutic space to 
deconstruct these and reformulate alternative narratives. Psychologists can 
                                                        
28 e.g. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence: Schizophrenia 
(2009) 
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overtly accept diagnostic labels while working on other issues in therapy, and  
join with service user to co-create and re-story their distress outside of DSM 
categories (Strong et al., 2012). By making strategic alliances with service users 
the psychologists can take up subversive positions to deterritorialize 
pathologised-pathologising discursive fields, and reterritorialize alternatives, that 
are ipso facto subversive (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2013). Thus emphasising 
the creative potential of resistance to disciplinary power-knowledge 
mechanisms. In this instance, the creative potential is again limited to local 
(micro and meso) levels leaving wider problematic discursive resources and 
practices unchanged. Vaclav Havel (1986) reflected that the structures and 
actions of totalitarian regimes “relegate personal conscience and 
consciousness to the bathroom”. In this case one is reminded that the dilemma 
of retreating into the therapeutic space can be balanced with transformative 
potential of subversive activity therein.  
 
6.3 Macro-politics 
Macro-politics considers insight talk at the level where the team interacts with 
wider systems. In this section the object of insight assessments is constructed 
as the team/system. The extension of psychologists’ remit to macro systems 
and the deployment of insight talk will be considered in terms of pastoral power 
and governmentality. By thinking, theorising and practicing at this level the 
psychologist is positioned as having transformation potential at every level of 
the system. 
 
Transforming clinical psychology into professional leaders in healthcare could 
trace its roots in several discursive and non-discursive practices. Applied 
psychologists draw on both systemic and psychodynamic theories to guide 
working with groups (Obholzer & Zagier Roberts, 1994). There has also been 
an interest in the application of ideas from Liberation Psychology, Feminism, 
critical theory, and Post-colonial theory in working directly with the community 
(Afuape, 2011). It has been suggested that psychologists are uniquely 
positioned to make a difference to staff morale, service delivery and innovation, 
and the promotion of service users voices within the system (Onyett, 2012). 
Also, that the profession evolved in an already dominated hegemonic field and 
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thus leadership in clinical psychology is predicated by the paradoxical position 
of psychiatry. Psychiatry historically can be seen as both instrumental in 
endorsing the fledgling discipline of clinical psychology in its early days but also 
creates the raison d’être for resistance more recently (Pilgrim & Treacher, 
1992).  
 
It would be misleading to suggest that these skills and theories are the preserve 
of clinical psychology as they are also evident in other mental health 
professions. But, there has been a considerable institutional drive to promote 
psychology as a leadership profession e.g. “Organising and Delivering 
Psychological Services” (DoH, 2004); “NWW” (Lavender & Hope, 2007); and 
“Clinical Psychology Leadership Development Framework” (BPS/DCP, 2010). 
The promotion of clinical psychologist as leaders could be considered an 
attempt to privilege psychological theories and/or ways of working in this 
context. This is often presented as a benevolent apolitical enterprise akin to 
Miller’s (1969) call to give psychology away. However, as mentioned it has been 
suggested that while giving “it” away, psychology has also simultaneously 
monopolised theory and practice in professional frameworks (Rapley & Miller, 
2003). In this way it not just epistemology but language that is not innocent 
(Andersen, 1996). 
 
The way insight is talked about in the promotion and practice of leadership and 
the privileging of psychological theories will be considered in terms of 
commissioning, psychologically minded workforce and outsight.  
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6.3.1 Commissioning  
The psychologists’ talked about working in an evolving mental health landscape 
and the importance of being positioned to influence service provision and 
design. However, being positioned politically does not militate against 
depoliticised constructions of distress nor apolitical subject positions in this 
arena. The extension of psychologists’ remit to influence the “insight” of 
commissioners is discussed. Rather than extend psychological ideas across the 
team as in the meso-political domain, this talk served to construct 
commissioners as legitimate objects of psychological thinking and thus can be 
considered an extension of pastoral power.   
 
(5287-5315) 
MM it sounds to me like you're describing there’s a lot of maybe confusion in 
the system about what it is that we’re dealing with, is that fair to say? 
P6 it's interesting, because one example, I was in a meeting just before with 
a primary-care lead, and we, we have primary secondary care interface 
meetings, and {BR} primary care is becoming:: really, like a big machine, 
you’re in you're out, you’ve got to be th-, if, if you’re not this, if you’ve got 
this disorder we don't accept you:: it's becoming this F::ascist regime in 
some ways 
MM mhm 
P6 kind of, like, not what it used to be:: although I can understand they’ve 
got to see more people, although what commissioners seem to think, 
well if you put more money in primary care, you’ll stop psychosis 
MM mhm 
P6 but that's the same thing as saying if you put on antiseptic cream you’ll 
stop skin cancer 
MM mhm 
P6 that's not going to stop the cancer 
MM yeah 
P6 to stop cancer you maybe need gen::etic treatment or:: stop them 
smoking or stop them from ((2)) doing something that’s actually causing 
it, giving a little bit of two session therapy, “oh that’s sorted out their 
attachment problems which are a vulnerability factor for their psychosis”, 
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and {BR} I think the insight of mental health is really lacking outside of 
mental health professionals 
MM right, right 
P6 and so, we've got a lot to do w::(()), I think what we’ve got {BR} it's 
wonderful time now:: I think its a great time ‘cause things are picking up 
more, and society’s now thinking about mental health 
 
In this extract the psychologist constructs themselves in relation to wider 
systems in a number of ways. Firstly, they present primary care as a “Fascist 
regime” – this is one of the most potent persona non grata that can be invoked 
in British culture. Primary care is described as a rigid, disorder driven, and 
prescriptive orientated service. In effect, it is positioned as inhumane but also as 
a de-humanising “big machine”. A series of disclaimers (Edwards & Potter, 
1992) follow which enable the psychologist to negotiate a number of subject 
positions. Initially the psychologist appears to accept the “big machine(’s)” need 
to “see more people” with the first use of the disclaimer “although”. This is itself 
negated by the second “although” that critiques the idea that more money will 
“stop psychosis”.   
 
However, it’s not just more money but it’s the perceived use of this in a 
simplistic way that is at stake. This draws on previously mentioned discourse 
that positions medics as purveyors of simplistic models to understand mental 
health. Thus making available the position of mental health experts and 
managers of complexity for psychologists take up. The psychologist does this 
by making a medical analogy with cancer. The analogy hinges on a formulation 
using a causal model, which borrows heavily from the prescriptive model of 
healthcare provision. This is not to assume that the psychologist believes in this 
type of care but it enables them to suggest a legitimate site of intervention in 
mental health “attachment problems which are a vulnerability factor for their 
psychosis”. This formulation is notable in that it privileges a depoliticised 
construction of distress i.e. individual vulnerability here is a reformulation of the 
previously mentioned diathesis-thesis model. Conversely, formulation itself can 
be said to be directly political in that privilege psychological explanations for 
mental health problems   
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Lastly, within this extract the psychologist democratises expertise to all “mental 
health professionals”. This can be considered part of the totalizing effect of 
promoting psychological ideas. In this instance, these experts are positioned 
vis-à-vis the commissioners. The psychologist appears to finish on a positive 
note seeing the lack of insight outside the expert subject as an opportunity to 
extend expertise into these areas.   
 
6.3.2 Psychologically Minded Workforce 
Psychologists take up subject positions that enabled them to promote 
psychology as both ordinary and esoteric. That is ordinary in that these skills 
reflect everyday human quality and esoteric as specific psy-technologies. By 
constructing ordinary-esoteric couplet, psychology can colonise the ordinary 
under esoteric and thus legitimise an extension of pastoral power into this 
domain. 
 
This has implications for subjectivity that is transformed within these discursive 
manoeuvres but also the available subjectivities of the systems they work in. 
 
(963-993) 
P2 this wasn’t about using a psychological therapy, this was just thinking 
about, eh, I guess engaging in, eh, potential eh, empathic eh, thinking 
with them about what might going for this patient. What are some of the 
reasons, the broad reasons in which people struggle to take em, 
medication rather than this being a rather simplistic, {BR} eh, 
oppositional thing, deviance 
MM yeah 
P2 em, and then, and then I guess in thinking about psychological 
approaches this would be more specific stuff, so, this would actually be 
then maybe formulating more specifically someone’s current distress for 
example, 
MM mhm 
P2 so, again, we might have {BR}, some basic information but being able to 
posit eh, eh, other eh, factors, that aren’t just eh, reducing it to sort of 
simplistic eh, “they’re like this because they’re depressed” {LG} 
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MM OK 
P2 em, of course lets think about what are some of the factors that might 
have led this person to feeling as they are feeling at the moment 
MM yeah 
P2 whether this be internal mechanisms, in terms of the way they are 
thinking about themselves, ruminating, or whatever {BR} or:: thinking 
about the sort of psycho-social interactions that actually we know this 
person has struggled with domestic abuse, or been threatened with 
housing, or you know, they have just lost their job 
MM mhm 
P2 {BR}, so I guess from my point of view eh, eh a lot of the stuff, I kind of 
end up bringing, is sort of a broad psychological theory em 
MM right 
P2 that’s sort of, em, the different perspectives that we are taught as clinical 
psychologists, and actually in my, in my triage work there is only a small 
amount of work that I would actually do in terms of therapy 
 
Throughout this extract the psychologists construct ordinary-esoteric couplet. 
This enables formulations that facilitate joining with the service user as non-
expert collaborative practitioner but perhaps a distancing from colleague as 
expert teacher. 
 
Over the course of the extract they refers to two psychological technologies i.e. 
therapy and formulation. Therapy as a technology is removed from the 
exchange early. The intervention “psychological therapy” is set against the 
ordinary human tools to intervene (“engagement” and “empathic”). The 
implications are to move beyond discipline specific intervention to one that 
everyone should be doing. The psychologist is positioned as an expert about, 
not only, what “might be going on for this patient” but how the system might also 
know and relate to the “patient”. This focusing on the service user, as noted, is 
part of a wider discourse person-centred care across the entire healthcare 
landscape. Despite this, psychologists’ position themselves as having a 
specialist role in promoting the person-centred approach that might be 
considered synchronise with the promotion of a psychologically-minded 
workforce.  
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The remaining section focuses of the use of formulation as tool to model for the 
system how it might come to know about and relate to the “patient”. As with 
other extracts the system is positioned as simplistic and the psychologist’s 
technology (i.e. formulation) helps them to move beyond the “simplistic” bad 
(“deviance”) and mad (“depressed”) formulation presented by the system for 
non-compliance. “Broad psychological” theory is presented as a way to 
understand. The broad psychological theory implied (“internal mechanism”, 
“ruminating”, “domestic abuse”) might be summarised as the psychosocial 
model.  
 
As previously stated the way we talk about and the systems of thought we use 
to order reality can influence the power-knowledge constellations that are made 
available to us. In the project for promoting a psychologically minded workforce 
and its connecting with person-centred care agenda it is worth asking if 
psychologists posturing is strictly apolitical? One can hardly argue that 
promoting service users’ voice is not a legitimate enterprise. Psychologist taking 
up a position of responsibility in terms of this can serve to positively reinforce 
their position as advocates for service users in the system. However, it can also 
be seen as threatening to other professional groups who may have to adopt 
different relational and interactional roles with service users.  
 
Finally, it may be worth reflecting on the processes of governmentality being 
played out here. The project for a psychologically minded workforce is at once 
both dependant on available discourses and a vehicle for their propagation. 
Thus the models of psychology privileged by the psychologist become those 
shared to the workforce. It is worth asking, if mental health services will be 
better served by more people who can formulate using psychological 
approaches?; or if psychology as an approach will be better served by mental 
health services that use this model? Similarly, person-centred care is now total 
discourse dominating the healthcare landscape. Nevertheless, non-discursive 
practices may not always serve to reinforce this effect e.g. the realpolitik of 
choice in mental health vis-à-vis forced detention and treatment. Thus can a 
person-centred approach transform mental health structures; or is the person-
centred approach trapped inside existing mental heath structures?  
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6.3.3 Outsight And Insight  
Outsight will refer to a way of thinking that seeks to promote a demystification of 
the psy-technologies e.g. therapy and/or formulation (or indeed the profession 
itself). It seeks to promote an understanding of the environmental factors that 
can be worked with and changed to make a material difference in people’s lives 
(Smail, 2006). Smail called for an orientation towards outsight rather than 
insight. However, here outsight and insight is preferred. In this sense it is the 
self-reflexive potential of teams (i.e. their insight) that can create conditions for 
outsight. For many service users, psychologists and the systems they work in 
are one environment that was talked about in relation to insight.  
 
(6869-6876) 
P7 I think that the systems, we need, we’re the ones who need the insight 
and the outsight 
MM the outsight 
P7 the outsight, yes, so that we can kind of, reflect on how:: you know, what 
are the external factors in ((2)) influencing us as well, that make us do 
these crazy things like divide people's difficulties into these little 
packages and em, you know 
 
This extract represents a summary of outsight/insight discourse. To extrapolate 
the point further without breaching anonymity it was necessary to provide an 
extract from an early point in the interview that did not directly reference the 
team.   
 
(6107-6119) 
P7 now to me that seems like a pathological way of relating 
MM hm:: 
P7 not by the client by the system you know 
MM mhm 
P7 and, {BR} and that there was no self reflection in that, there was no 
insight {LG} in a sense, as to how {BR} as a system, you know, ((3)) i:: it 
was dealing with this, this woman and her issues {BR} em:: ((3)) and 
then ((3)) you know t:: eh, phe her complaints about the system, I think 
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were all being understood as something about her:: way of relating and 
nothing about::, you know, the, the systemic issues 
MM how the system works 
P7 yeah exactly, exactly {BR} um, ((2)) so, ((2)) yeah, that's, that's you know 
kinda one example, that yeah 
 
Here the psychologist talks about the system’s lack of insight. The psychologist 
talks about the system as a collective with psychology as part of this “I think that 
the systems [… ] we’re the ones”. Previously we have proposed that 
psychologists are positioned, or position themselves, in contradictory spaces. 
For example, re-producing-reproducing individualising models of care at micro-
level; and extending the object of insight as assessment to proximal colleagues 
at the meso-level; and attempts to reframe hegemony with the promotion of 
psychologically minded services at the macro-level. In each case the 
psychologist is positioned as marginal moving between various discursive and 
non-discursive practices. Here the psychologists constructs a totality “we” “the 
system”. This creates the conditions of the psychologist not just acting 
strategically on the system but with self-reflexive potential.  
 
In the example, the psychologist constructs the system’s lack of insight in 
relation to a service user’s complaint. By positioning the system as 
“pathological” and unwilling to “relate” or try to “understand” the service user 
they are simultaneously positioning themselves as outside of this. They note 
that within this, the service user is dismissed and her “complaint” is formulated 
as “something about her”. This is a potential example of “crazy things [the 
system does] like divide people's difficulties into these little packages”. This is 
particularly pertinent given the increasing economic and political pressure to 
role out package based approached e.g. IAPT and clustering. However, it also 
alludes to the broader discourses that support these “little package(s)” 
approaches i.e. individualising and depoliticising constructions of distress 
embedded in hegemonic mental health models (Pilgrim, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
86 
This theme was replicated in a number of other interviews and involved similar 
constructions in multi-disciplinary teams. Critically, the psychologist draws on a 
psychology technology self-reflexivity to suggest that the team lacked the ability 
to think about this service user outside of a very limited range of discursive 
recourses, namely those that constructed a “complaint” as part of an individual’s 
pathology. However, by invoking “we’re the ones who need the insight and the 
outsight” creates the possibilities of extending pastoral power and the promotion 
of psychologically minded workforce within the reflexive frame. Thus, through 
reflexivity, the psychologist can be considered an active social agent that is 
both constituted by and constitutive of system wide discursive and non-
discursive practices. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This section will summarise the main findings from the analysis and then 
consider practical implications across each of the three domains 
(micro/meso/macro-politics). This will focus on “reproductive/re-productive” 
power as a dilemma in the psy-encounter, the adoption of pragmatism, and the 
promotion of psychologically minded workforce respectively. The critical review 
will consider epistemological and personal reflexivity (Willig, 2008). That is, the 
degree to which a set of validity criteria can be applied to this research and the 
position of the researcher as a co-constructor of discourse in the interview 
process will be considered. 
 
7.1 Analysis Summary 
This research focused on two main questions: 
1. How do clinical psychologists’ construct the notion of insight and how 
does this informs their practice? 
2. To explore the kind of subject positions these constructions makes 
available?  
The three sections described in the analysis are not intended to be discrete 
domains but interacting and connected spheres of social action. Each domain 
necessarily draws on the discursive and non-discursive resources of the others. 
They might be considered analogous to interacting strata or plateaus that 
permit multiplicity (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2013). That is, dynamic domains 
that dialogically co-create and re-create each other. Thus the subjectivities 
discussed must also be seen as dynamic, relational, and both constituted by 
and constitutive of the contingency of the social space. As such, the 
subjectivities can be considered to have a “range of potential” through access to 
the available horizon of truth (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/2013). In this research 
power-knowledge constellations were considered one determining factor that 
both extends and limits the horizon of truth. 
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At the micro-political domain “insight talk” considered insight as psy-model, 
narrative insight, and formulation. Power was conceived of in terms of 
governmentality and reproduction/re-production processes. In terms of Q.1, the 
majority of participants recognised the term “insight” but reported that it did not 
feature in their practice. Nevertheless, they deployed analogous ideas to 
formulate “problematised” service users. In terms of Q.2, this offered 
opportunities to “reproduce” individualising and depoliticised constructions of 
distress. However, it also created opportunities to “re-produce” alternative 
constructions with the potential to transform and extend subjectivity. Narrative 
insight was considered one way in which person-centred “insights” could be co-
constructed in the psy-encounter. Formulation was seen as a key psy-
technology to augment bio-medical “thin” descriptions with “thick” descriptions 
(Geertz, 1973).  
 
At the meso-political domain psychologists’ “insight talk” positioned them in 
relation to their colleagues. In terms of Q.1, they inverted “insight talk” about 
service users to construct their colleagues as the object of insight assessments. 
However, this interaction was constructed as part of a general negotiation of 
contested sites in mental health contexts. In response to Q.2, as one of the 
contested sites, “insight talk” enabled psychologists to articulate this negotiation 
in terms of strategic helping, pragmatist, and subversive positions. Meso-politics 
was considered in terms of disciplinary power and the impact on subjectivity of 
various resistance strategies deployed to work with and against hegemonic bio-
medicalism. Pastoral power was introduced to think about the emergence of a 
radical response to bio-medicalism and developed further at the macro-political 
domain. Pastoral power was discussed in relation to the pedagogic exercise of 
promoting alternative models of understanding distress. 
 
At the macro-political level “insight talk” was thought of in terms of the wider 
system. In terms of Q.1, the research proposed the construction of 
commissioners and systems as lacking insight. In answer to Q.2, outsight and 
the promotion of a psychologically minded workforce were considered as an 
antidote to this. The positioning of psychologists as leaders legitimises this 
critique and antidote. Developing a psychologically minded workforce can be 
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seen as an expression of pastoral power with the potential to transform and 
extend both the available roles of psychology but also subjectivity across the 
entire system. That is, to extend the available “regimes of truth” to think about 
themselves and others in psy-encounters. Nevertheless, this can also be seen 
to reflect wider professional and policy discourses and thus also an expression 
of governmentality. 
7.2 Implications 
7.2.1 Micro-implications 
The reproduction/re-production tension at the micro-political domain presents a 
series of dilemmas for psychologists working in adult mental health. Principle 
among them is the potential to reproduce bio-medicalism through the 
development of analogous theories and practices. As noted previously, bio-
psychosocial formulations of madness can be more appropriately labelled bio-
bio-bio formulations (Read et al., 2009). Formulation itself can be seen as an 
organising psy-technology and thus entirely dependent on the available theories 
and models applied in its use. For example, formulations organised using CBT 
(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001) or systemic/family life-
cycle (Carter & McGoldrick’s, 2004) models privileges different types of 
information thus enabling various power-knowledge constellations with resulting 
impact on subjectivity. Nevertheless, narrative approaches to insight (and of 
distress in general) that privilege the service user and reposition them as the 
authors of their own experience present as a potential alternative. However, 
situating this at the micro-political level simultaneously limits the impact it can 
have on challenging or changing dominant paradigms. 
 
Furthermore, service users who have been in contact with services for many 
years may have learned how to deploy medicalised constructions of themselves 
to their advantage (Goffman, 1961; Bourdieu, 1986). For example, Dillon (2011) 
reports that service users are not encouraged to speak about their “unusual 
experiences” in inpatient settings. This is echoed by Duggins (2010) who 
suggests ward review are characterised by “good patients” who unambiguously 
accept care plans, while “difficult patients” question treatment rationale and 
want to discuss their distress. 
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It has been suggested that clinicians should be more aware of the impact of the 
language they use and more explicit about limitations of the knowledge 
deployed in practice (Lofgren, Hewitt & das Nair 2014). Therefore, the 
application carte blanche of narrative approaches potentially runs the risk of re-
colonising and suppressing the service users’ meaning making capacity with 
another “regime of truth”. The present research suggests that a reflexive 
approach to the theories and language used in the psy-encounter promotes 
different opportunities for both service users and practitioners to extend the 
subjectivity beyond limited and limiting bio-medical formulations. 
 
7.2.2 Meso-implications  
The adoption of a pragmatic approach dovetails with this reflexive stance. 
Pragmatism in this instance reflects a pluralist, critical, non-relativist, and action-
orientated practice (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009). Reflexivity applied here permits 
an iterative and critical approach by the practitioner to the available discursive 
and non-discursive tools in psy-encounters. This construction of the subject 
departs from traditional discourse analytic circles and proposes the subject as 
both constitutive of and constituted by discourse (Davies & Harré, 1990; 
Wetherell, 1998). In so doing, it facilitates the construction of the pragmatic 
practitioner who is able to reflexively engage with theory and apply this in 
practice. By adopting elements of multiple models the practitioner can 
strategically and contingently align with a variety of actors to achieve selected 
goals. Thus the cynical appraisal of ideology “they know very well…” holds even 
greater radical potential than assumed at first glance (Sloterdijk, 1983/1988; 
Žižek, 1989). The pragmatist position simultaneously recruits and critiques 
available discourses (e.g. bio-medicalism). This research suggests forging local 
alliances can enable radical contingency i.e. the capacity to affect the legitimacy 
of hegemonic discourses and thus the entire ideological façade (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1986).  
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However, pragmatism in psychology can be seen as part of an intellectual and 
theoretical compromise analogous to the eclectic practitioners that emerged in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Goldie, 1977; Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). As a 
compromise it may lead to adopting contradictory and perhaps incompatible 
epistemological, ontological and ethical positions. Pragmatism might offer 
practical and localised solutions to emerging issues; conversely, it might 
present an inconsistent approach that negates a sustained and coherent 
challenge to bio-medical constructions of distress. In either event, pragmatism 
expands the conceptualisation of a static hegemonic bio-medicalism to a 
dynamic and malleable mental health discursive field that can be moulded.      
 
7.2.3 Macro-implications 
The construction of psychologists as having a legitimate role in shaping 
discourses in mental health can be seen in the enterprise to develop a 
psychologically minded workforce. This raises a number of important points, for 
example what is “psychologically minded” and who decides? That psychology 
has received a political mandate to provide educational opportunities to other 
staff groups is not new, being first muted in the 1980s Mowbray review (Pilgrim 
& Treacher, 1992). It has also been promoted more recently in the form of the 
leadership agenda within psychology (Lavender & Hope, 2007; BPS, 2010). 
 
However, it is worth reflecting the clinical psychology of the 1980s is markedly 
different from that practiced today. One might consider the profession as 
emerging and evolving in the shadow of continual crises that has resulted in 
multiple expressions of what comes to be called “clinical psychology” at that 
time. It has been suggested that the profession went through three distinct 
phases up to 1979, i.e. psychometrics, behaviourism, and eclecticism 
(Richards,1983 cited in Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). The 1980s and early 1990s 
heralded the era of “managerialism” (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). Managerialism 
led to rapid expansion and consolidation of the profession but also the 
beginnings of an attempt to atomise the work of clinical psychology. Thus the 
price of expansion and full state recognition was increased control. One might 
see IAPT29 as one current incarnation of this tendency. It could be argued that 
                                                        
29 Improving Access to Psychological Therapy 
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this phase has given way to the “leadership phase” and this is reflected in 
processes of governmentality e.g. the overt orientation to leadership in clinical 
training and practice (BPS, 2010).  
 
However, to a greater or lesser degree clinical psychology has promoted itself 
as a “scientist” profession. The “scientist-practitioner” model initially proposed at 
the Boulder conference has been the dominant expression of “scientism” by the 
profession since the 1950s (Albee, 2000). While initially refuted by influential 
psychologists in the UK (Eysenck, 1949), it was eagerly adopted as the 
profession evolved beyond the psychometrics phase (Pilgrim & Treacher, 
1992). Nevertheless, there appears to be a subtle but discernable shift away 
from this model in training. The term “scientist-practitioner” does not appear in 
any of the three North Thames training group information material30. This shift is 
very recent as at least one course (UEL) contained a reference to it in the 
promotional material for the training cohort 2008-2011. This means that entrants 
to the programme in 2015 could well be supervised by psychologists who were, 
at least to some degree, exposed to different forms of governmentality in 
relation to what it means to be a psychologist. It is also noteworthy that the 
terms “reflexive”, “reflective” and “reflexivity” all appear in the current 
perspectives of these courses.  
 
What I am proposing here is that there are different ideological expressions of 
what “psychology” is. Thus there are potentially, multiple expressions of what a 
psychologically minded workforce should be (scientist-practitioner, reflexive-
practitioner, evidence-based-practitioner etc.). Is it possible that we are entering 
a new phase of profession, leaving behind “leadership” in favour of “reflexivity”? 
Who decides what psychology is, deserves greater scrutiny and may be a 
useful avenue for future research in this area.  
 
One facet of reflexivity might consider the impact of the language we use in 
practice (Hedges, 2010). A reflexive approach to language may result in an 
orientation away from a view of language as a means to circulate meaning to a 
mechanism to distribute contradictory regimes of truth (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/2013). If the central tenet of ideology is to hide the true effect of power 
                                                        
30 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/chpccp/ lasted accessed 1.5.2015 
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(Marx, 1867/1976; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/2002; Žižek, 1989) what would 
be the impact of creating a mass of critically minded reflexive practitioners in 
mental health? It is also worth noting that a reflexivity based on pragmatism 
may reflect a radical extension of individualism i.e. idiosyncratic locally tailored 
formulations to meet immediate ends. While we have seen an expansion, and 
to some extent an endorsement, of individualism in the form of neo-liberal 
politics since the 1980s this paradoxically does not necessarily result in greater 
local autonomy for those working in mental health in the public (Pilgrim & 
Treacher, 1992) or community/charity sector (Speed, 2011). Thus in highlighting 
the enterprise to promote a “psychologically minded workforce” and what might 
be called the “reflexive-turn” in the profession, I am suggesting that more 
research is merited to explore this enterprise in greater detail. Furthermore, 
clinical psychology has displayed great flexibility in adapting to emerging socio-
economic and political contexts in its short history. Nevertheless, a critical 
appraisal of the utility of eclectic and pragmatic approaches may be required to 
continue to evolve as a profession. 
 
7.3 Evaluative criteria 
As stated in the method section the evaluative criteria applied here will draw on 
coherence, transparency and rigour, and impact (Yardley, 2008). Researcher 
reflexivity (Burman, 2004) will be discussed in section 7.4. 
 
7.3.1 Coherence 
Coherence refers to being sensitive to both the micro and macro level patterns 
in the text (Potter & Wetherell, 1997). This was achieved by attending to the 
exceptions in the data and led to an expanded formulation of power. Initial 
readings focused on “disciplinary power” and tended to privilege a reading of 
top-down power application and implications. Through supervision and the 
aforementioned hermeneutic circle I was able to consider what else might be 
happening in the text in relation to subjectivity and power. This led to a reading 
that proposed a polyvalent and productive power. This can be seen in the 
extension of disciplinary to “re-production/reproduction” power and the 
extension of governmentality to pastoral power.  
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7.3.2 Transparency And Rigour 
Transparency and rigour are important to contextualise qualitative research 
(Yardley, 2008). In this research, I have clearly outlined by rationale for 
developing the research questions. In the methodology, I outlined how the 
analysis was approached and the shortcomings proposed by Antaki at al. 
(2003) were attended to throughout. The audit trail (Appendix K-L) gives an 
account of the analysis from start to finish.  
 
7.3.3 Impact 
As noted, I have created the platform to engage in a dialogue with the 
participants and services about this research. In many ways, this can be said to 
have started in the interviews themselves where many participants reported 
finding it useful to think about how insight and related constructs are applied in 
practice. The following extract echoed this theme that ran throughout the 
interviews. 
 
(8658-8662)  
P9 I think it's been very interesting and it makes me think {BR} about how 
((3)) {LS} you know a lot of these things once you questioned them 
they’re quite amorphous you know, there, there’s less shape really, and I 
think I ((3)) I, I, ha::- have a sense that, they’ve got more of a shape than 
they do in fact 
 
The psychologist here reflects on the idea that “a lot of these things” 
(psychological constructs) are assumed to have more shape than they do and 
that the process of reflecting on them has prompted a re-recognition of this. 
This suggests that the establishment, and maintenance, of reflective forums can 
be usefully used to critique established and establishment practices. This 
creates a dilemma for practitioners wishing to justify such forums. In the face of 
increasingly stringent economic climate establishing practices not directly linked 
to revenue streams (e.g. service user contact) may be difficult. However, 
recourse to research and initiatives linked to patient-centred care approaches 
may well support an argument for such forums. This research proposes that a 
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reflexive approach to “insight talk” (language and practices) can enable service 
users voices to be heard and thus evidence for the utility of such forums. 
 
7.4 Critical Review 
7.4.1 Epistemological Reflexivity 
I have previously proposed that epistemology is not neutral (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/2013). In taking up a social constructionist position in the research I have 
in effect engaged in act of intellectual colonisation. That is, it can be said to be 
part of a language game that legitimises some claims over others (Rorty, 1979). 
One claim I have made is to propose that subjectivity is both constituent and 
constitutive of language. This was, in part, an attempt to integrate these poles 
that are the source of the dilemma of subjectivity in social constructionism. This 
être/et position can itself be said to be a replication of the eclecticism, that has 
been critiqued as an intellectually sterile compromise (Pilgrim & Treacher, 
1992).  
 
However, I have tried, where necessary, to outline some of the philosophical 
debates that support this être/et position. This may be taxing for the reader. Yet 
ideas around subjectivity and what it means to work in and with contested social 
spaces are complicated matters. Therefore, allowing multiple narratives “to be”, 
“and” be open to not understanding too quickly is a central concern in theory 
and practice (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988). Thus eclecticism, as a language 
game, need not be sterile but requires a radical reflexive dialogue. A dialogue 
that actively interrogate ones own knowledge(s) but also attempts to knit in 
complex ideas stitch by stitch into fabric of ordinary interactions (Weingarten, 
1998). 
7.4.2 Personal Reflexivity 
In line with the social constructionist stance of this research one can legitimately 
claim that the interview, like all sites of interaction, is a site of co-constructed 
meaning (Burr, 2003). Willig (2001) suggests it is important to recognise the 
extent to which the researcher shapes the interview by leading, prompting, 
directing and avoiding topics in conversation. Thus, a brief note on some 
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possible ways in which I shaped (constitutive) and was shaped (constituent) by 
the interview process will be discussed.  
7.4.2.1 Shaping interviews 
As a white-male in the UK my Irishness can be subverted in social interactions. 
This can be doubly obscured in “professional” contexts. In this way my 
subjectivity becomes limited by and subjected to an image of ideal-patriarchy 
i.e. white, male, middle-class, British. This is in stark contrast to a view I have of 
myself as an outsider deeply critical of, and concerned, with patriarchy in 
various forms. This is a paradoxical space in which I often oscillate between 
conformity and resistance. Race, gender etc. were largely obscured in the 
interviews though this might be an obvious site to explore the interaction 
between constructions of insight-rationality in mental health. This might be a 
reflection of my attempts at strategic alignment with various positions in the 
social space (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). However, it may also reflect a post-
colonial attitude to oppression and liberation (Moane, 1999). This central post-
colonial paradox revolves around a tension to love-loath and respect-resist that, 
which you cannot have. 
 
In the interviews, I attempted to hold up a critical lens to all interviewees and 
myself in interaction. This required a delicate balancing act to join with and 
criticise simultaneously. Bio-medicalism is an obvious patriarchal model evident 
in mental health care. However, some, but not all, of the interviewees 
expressed views broadly similar to mine. I hope that I was able to engage in 
sufficient critical discussion in these interviewees, in particular, to push these 
theories to sufficiently explore the implications for subjectification in their 
articulation and practice. 
 
7.4.2.2 Shaped by interviews 
It has been suggested that discourse analytic models should favour naturalistic 
text/talk were possible (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) as other co-constructed 
spaces necessarily involve stake management (Willig, 2001). This is particularly 
pertinent in an interview space between a trainee and practicing clinical 
psychologist. In some respects an interview of this type presents as a 
potentially revealing social space. Therefore, it is understandable that 
interviewees may seek to act to present favourable representation of 
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themselves. This is further amplified by expectations of what a “UEL trainee” 
might believe in and the way a “UEL graduate” might be expected (or expect 
themselves) to practise31. To some extent this dramaturgical dimension could 
be anticipated as a legitimate strategy to manage the self in any social 
interaction (Goffman, 1959). Furthermore, the participants were a self-selecting 
group and thus some assumptions about their readiness and willingness to 
expose their practice can be made i.e. they were more willing. It is noteworthy, 
that participants drew on a number of ideas about “insight” highlighting both 
positive “use-value” and “useless” connotations attached to its deployment in 
clinical practice. On the flip side, as a self-selecting group, it does raise 
questions about what, if any, alternative discursive and non-discursive 
resources may not be accounted for in this research. 
 
The interviews in this research presented the challenge of “unpackaging (of) the 
gloss” (Jefferson, 1985). That is, how to avoid colluding with unproblematic 
accounts in the interview? Thus, within every interview I attempted to self-
reflexively manage and monitor what was not being talked about. It is beyond 
the scope to cover every strategy, but two examples may help to illuminate how 
this was managed. 
  
Firstly, I attempted to actively enquire about alternative narratives and instances 
that might go against what was being proposed by the speaker. Secondly, the 
position of trainee via a relatively powerful other presents a considerable 
challenge to this “unpackaging”. As a trainee soon to graduate I felt an 
expectation to demonstrate research skills, critical acumen, good rapport etc. 
befitting of a final year trainee. This is in the context of a critical analysis of 
potential future employers and colleagues. In being the interviewer, it felt at 
times as if I was being interviewed. This required actively attending to myself 
both in the interviews, in reflections after, and in the on going dialogue with the 
texts. Thus, the interview process became an expression of a relational 
dilemma – becoming aware of the desire for recognition and the recognition of 
desire (Žižek, 2006).  
                                                        
31 UEL’s critical ethos and resultant expectations were directly mentioned in 6/9 
interviews. 
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APPENDIX A: INSIGHT SCALES 
Table 1: Summary of dimensions covered by insight scales (Adopted from 
Tranulis, Corin & Kirmayer, 2008 p. 231). 
Dimensions PANSS ITAQ SAI SUMD BCIS 
1. acceptance of illness label X X X X  
2. awareness of having a mental 
disorder 
  X X  
3. perceived need for treatment  X X   
4. awareness of treatment benefit    X  
5. attributions of benefit of treatment  X    
6. awareness of signs & symptoms   X X X 
7. attribution of signs & symptoms to 
having mental disorder 
   X X 
8. awareness of social consequences 
of illness 
   X X 
9. lack of judgment   X    
10. self-reflectiveness     X 
11. Self-certainty     X 
PANNS: Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay et al., 1987) 
ITAQ: Insight and Treatment Attitude Questionnaire (Mc Evoy et al., 1989) 
SAI: Schedule for Assessing the three components of Insight (David et al., 
1992) 
SUMD: Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (Amador et al., 
1993) 
BCIS: Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck et al., 2004) 
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APPENDIX B: PSYCINFO SEARCH 
Table 2: PsycINFO search 20th November 2012 
Search Terms in “subject fields” Number of results 
Hearing  + Voice* + Haloperidol 0 
Hearing  + Voice* + Olanzapine 0 
Auditory + Hallucination* + Haloperidol 9 
Auditory + Hallucination*+ Olanzapine 13 
Hearing  + Voice* + Schizo* 15 
Auditory + Hallucination*+ Schizo* 654 
Olanzapin+ Schizo* 1388 
Haloperidol+ Schizo* 1462 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* denotes a truncation used to extend the search terms. Using it includes, e.g. 
schizophrenia, schizophrenic, schizo-affective etc. This was used in an attempt to 
capture as many variations of the term used in the search. 
Haloperidol is a typical anti-psychotic. Olanzapine is an atypical anti-psychotic.  
PsycINFO is an abstract database that provides systematic coverage of the 
psychological literature from the 1800s to the present. Similar trends were observed in 
PubMed, and as a result are not reported. PubMed is a search engine with a broader 
remit including both biomedical and life science journals.   
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APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE OF SUBJECTIFICATION 
 
An example of the process of subjectification applied to labels attached to users 
of mental health services.  
An example from the current health care landscape may be illustrative. People 
accessing mental health services can both identify with and be referred to using 
a number of labels, each permits and limits; maintains and resists; reproduces 
and produces a variety of power relations and subjectification. Power relations 
can be considered ways in which social action and discourses attempt to define 
and fix the power relationships between social actors (O’Farrell, 2005). 
Subjectification relates to processes that produce subjectivity and to make 
subject to (Henriques et al., 1986). Subjectivity in this sense is related to 
identity, but rather than an internal stable entity, it is proposed as relational and 
contingent. Thus, in this social constructionist reading, subjectivity is preferred 
as this enables a dynamic subject to make available multiple and contradictory 
positions with social relationships. In this sense the subject is positioning 
(actively producing subjectivity) and positioned by (subject to this idea). 
So, with this in mind let us return to the example. People accessing services 
can be referred to as service users, patients, survivors, consumers etc. For 
example, “patients” and “consumer” might identify as such in only a limited 
number of social situations e.g. mental health assessment. Thus, this 
subjectivity is only part of multiple other subjectivities that they can take up e.g. 
mother, friend, colleague and so on. However, in the assessment a “patient” 
and/or “consumer” might enable various positions to be taken up in relation to 
the truth claims made by the clinician, view of self in relation to this professional 
“opinion”, and availability of choice(s) in response to treatment(s) offered. 
However, in a variety of ways people might take up different positions within 
one context. It should also be noted that the position of health care “consumer” 
is promoted in the current NHS landscape (Speed, 2011) yet this position is 
also undermined by institutional practices of forced treatment and detention 
promoted ideologically through, for example, diagnosis and risk of bio-
medicalism and enshrined legally in the apparatus of the Mental Health Act 
(2007) and Mental Capacity Act (2005). Thus, subjectivities can be thought of 
multiple, contradictory, and dynamic. 
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF RHETORICAL DEVICES  
Edwards and Potter (1992, p160-163) & Taylor, 2011 
 
CL32 Category Entitlement Claim supported by recourse to the  
the entitlement of the category 
membership of the speaker. 
 
VD Vivid description Rich in descriptive detail gives 
impression perceptual re-experience as 
well as idea that speaker has particular  
observational skills of the speaker e.g. 
quotation – s/he said … 
 
N Narrative Closely related to VD – account given 
as part of long narrative, often fuse 
description and causation 
 
SV Systematic vagueness Opposite to VD – lack of clarity and thus 
can negate refuting account presented 
 
EA Empiricist accounting e.g. scientific talk – reify entities or give 
agency to objects in and of themselves 
 
RA Rhetoric of argument Constructing claims in the form of logic 
– e.g. if-then formulations 
 
EC Extreme case formulation Providing extreme case to legitimise 
own account e.g. everybody does it or 
nobody use it here 
 
CC Consensus and corroboration 
 
Blend consensus with normativity – 
used to forge alliances in speech 
 
LC Lists and contrasts Creating lists e.g. 3 part list thus gives 
impression  
 
SI Stake inoculation Attempts to remove own interest from 
account therefore claim to objectivity 
 
SC Show concession Often presented in 3 part structure, 
claim, concession (okay), reprise (but) – 
presents counter argument but 
undermines it to strengthen validity of 
initial claims  
 
 
 
                                                        
32 Abbreviation of rhetorical devices marked on left hand side of text. 
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APPENDIX E: UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON RESEARCH ETHICS 
COMMITTEE  
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APPENDIX F:  NHS R&D COMMITTEE ETHICS 
 
XX33 Trust (XXXFT) R&D Committee Confirmation  
 
From: XX XX [XX.XX@XX.nhs.uk]   
Sent: 04 September 2014 11:28   
To: XX XX   
Cc: Manus MOYNIHAN; Moynihan Manus   
 
Subject: RE: Re: Project Requiring Ethical Approval     
 
Dear XX,     
 
This project has approval from the Clinical Director to proceed and been 
reviewed by the Chair of the Ethics Committee.     
 
Kind regards,   
XX XX       
 
From: XX XX        
XX XX  Quality Outcomes & Experience Analyst   
XX NHS Foundation Trust   
Trust Headquarter, XXXXX 
Tel: XXX  
Email: XX.XX@XX.nhs.uk       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33 X denotes a redaction to preserve anonymity of the Trust, services, 
participants 
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APPENDIX G: THE INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
School of Psychology 
Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Principal Investigator(s) 
Manus Moynihan 
Email: u1236141@uel.ac.uk Telephone: 020 8223 4174 
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to 
consider in deciding whether to participate a research study. The study is being 
conducted as part of my Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology degree at the 
University of East London. 
 
Project Title 
Clinical Psychologists’ constructions of insight in adult mental health 
 
Project Description 
What is the aim of the research? 
I am interested in understanding more about the way the notion of insight is 
constructed by clinical psychologists working in adult mental health settings and how 
this informs your work with service users, families and other team members. 
 
What will the study involve? 
Participation in this study will involve taking part in a single, 40-60 minute long 
interview with the investigator, which will be audio-recorded. During the interview you 
will be asked some questions about your work and your day-to-day activity in mental 
health services. You can talk as much or as little as you like about each question. The 
interview will take place at a location that suits you, but cannot take place in a public 
place e.g. a café. 
 
Are there any risks to participation? 
I do not think that there are any risks to taking part. However, in the unlikely event that 
the material discussed raises some distressing feelings, the researcher will offer a 
break from the interview or to terminate it at your request and offer you support with 
these feelings. It is not envisaged that the interview will reveal any information of 
concern regarding harm to you or to others. However, should a disclosure of this 
nature emerge in the interview, the researcher is duty bound to report this to the 
relevant person. This will be discussed with you prior to the interview.   
      
 
 
 
 
Please turn over sheet → 
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Are there any benefits to participation? 
I do not think that there will be any direct benefits in taking part in this research. 
However, many psychologists may enjoy the opportunity to think and talk about their 
practice. It could be considered an interesting time to do this with radical changes 
promised to service provision structures, ever increasingly complexity of service user 
needs, and the evolving nature of mental health narratives (e.g. recently published 
DSM-V). A summary and/or full report of the research will be made available upon 
request. You can also request to have the researcher come to your team to present the 
ideas generated in the research.  
 
Confidentiality of the Data 
All personal information will be stored on encrypted files on the researchers computer. 
No personal details will be linkable to raw data files or anonymized transcripts, which 
will be locked in separate encrypted files. The transcripts will be coded so that your 
name is not associated with any of the information you provide and all subsequent use 
of the data will be completely anonymous. Anonymized transcriptions will be stored in 
encrypted files for additional analysis for five years following completion of the study. 
I may use direct quotes from you in the final report and/or dissemination emerging from 
the research. However, any identifying data such as your name and where you come 
from will remain completely anonymous. 
 
Location 
Interviews can take place in mutually agreed location. I appreciate the considerable 
workload of NHS staff working in this setting, and will be flexible to travel to the place of 
your place of work should this be required. However, no interview can take place in a 
public place. 
Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study and should not feel coerced. You are free 
to withdraw at any time up the end of data collection (31st March 2015). Should you 
choose to withdraw from the study you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and 
without any obligation to give a reason. Should you withdraw after the 31st March 2015, 
the researcher reserves the right to use your anonymized data in the write-up of the 
study and any further analysis that may be conducted by the researcher. 
 
 
Please feel free to ask me any questions. If you are happy to continue you will be 
asked to sign a consent form prior to your participation. Please retain this invitation 
letter for reference.  
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been conducted, 
please contact the study’s supervisor Dr. David Harper, School of Psychology, 
University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. (Tel: 020 8223 4174. Email 
d.harper@uel.ac.uk) 
or  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr. Mark Finn, 
School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. 
(Tel: 020 8223 4493. Email: m.finn@uel.ac.uk) 
 
Thank you in anticipation. Yours sincerely, Manus Moynihan 
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APPENDIX H: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Interview schedule – Clinical Psychologists insight in adult mental health 
 Information sheet (read and understood – opportunity to ask questions), right to 
withdraw, consent and confidentiality 
 Check audio recording equipment 
 Outline time frame (40-60 minutes)  
 Take questions about the study at the end 
Main topics & prompts 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your background and your training? 
2. What ways do you work in your team? 
3. Are there different ideas in your team about how you could be working? 
4. Interested in term “insight” is this something you use? 
If yes: 
 How does insight help you in work – example 
 When is not helpful – example 
 Do you think and talk about insight differently with teams/service users/family? 
 Why might this be? 
 
If no;  
 What other words or concepts do you use to think about these clinical 
concerns? 
 Do you talk very differently about this? 
 What does this look like in your clinical work? 
 What does this look like with your team members? 
 What does this look like with service user/families? 
5. Word and notion – explore how view this as different 
 Is insight important word in adult mental health? 
 Do you think there are other ideas about insight in the team? 
6. Is it important that people: 
 Recognise they are unwell 
 Engage with services – accept treatment offered 
 Accept diagnosis 
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7. I am Interested in different views on service user engagement? 
 What role does psychology (you) have in client engagement? 
 
Consultancy One to one work Compliance / treatment 
options / admission  
Stuck-ness: 
What do the team come with 
How talk about it? 
How resolve ? - example 
How do you think about this? 
How do you work with team 
on this? 
What resources do you draw 
on?  
How is this thought about 
in the team? 
What input do you have? 
 
 
 How do you think about engagement/ non-engagement? 
 Does the team differ on how they think about engagement – why might this be? 
 Example “good” engagement – why was this so?  Diagnosis, prognosis, 
meaning  
 Example “bad” engagement – why was this so?  
 Does the team think psychology is useful with this? When useful – when not ? 
 Is engagement thought differently: gender – ethnicity  
8. Access 
Who, when and how do people refer to psychology in your team? 
What ideas inform those decisions? (can you give a recent example of a referral 
and the discussions you had about it) 
What ideas inform your decision to accept, reject or define alternative way of 
working with the SU & team member 
 
6. Service User disagreement in terms of diagnosis, treatment options etc. (e.g. cause 
and categorisation of experience as “illness”) 
 How does your team talk about service user disagreement? 
 Can you give me an example – has this been helpful? – why? 
 Can you add this to this conversation - has this been helpful? – why? 
 When has this not been helpful – example? – why?  
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APPENDIX I: CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
 
                             Consent to participate in a research study  
 
Title of study: Clinical Psychologists’ constructions of insight in adult 
mental health 
 
Name of researcher: Manus Moynihan 
Thank you for taking part in this research study. 
 
 Initial 
- I have read the information sheet relating to the above research 
study and have been given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes 
of the research have been explained to me, and I have had the 
opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about this 
information. I understand what is being proposed and the procedures 
in which I will be involved have been explained to me. 
 
______ 
- I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data 
from this research, will remain strictly confidential. Only the 
researcher involved in the study will have access to identifying data. It 
has been explained to me what will happen once the research study 
has been completed. 
 
______ 
- I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has 
been fully explained to me. Having given this consent I understand 
that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason.  
 
 
______ 
- I also understand that should I withdraw after 31st March 2015, the 
researcher reserves the right to use my anonymous extracts in the 
write-up of the study and in any further analysis that may be 
conducted by the researcher. 
 
______ 
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) 
…………………………………………………. 
 
Participant’s Signature    …………………………………………………. 
 
Researcher’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
…………………………………………………. 
 
Researcher’s Signature  …………………………………………………. 
 
Date: ……………………..……. 
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APPENDIX J: TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
 
(.) Indicate a pause of less than 1 second 
((x)) Indicate a pause of more than 1 second, with x replaced with 
the number of seconds e.g. 3 seconds as ((3)) 
{LG} Laughter 
{LS} Lip smack 
{BR} Intake of breath 
:: Emphasis and/or exaggeration of letter sound e.g. not:: 
- Indicates a breakoff of utterance e.g. th- 
th- (+there) Indicates a breakoff of utterance, where reasonable guess can 
be made of the intended word 
(()) Unintelligible speech 
XXX Replace any place name to preserve anonymity 
mhm/mmm/eh Sounds transcribed phonetically 
Px Participant followed by a number to denote which participant 
e.g P6 = participant 6 
MM Interviewers initials 
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APPENDIX K: EXAMPLE OF CODED TEXT 
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APPENDIX L: AUDIT TRAIL 
 
Initial themes  
 
Psychologist as TMT As thoughtful multi-theory practitioner, exceptional, 
work with complexity, antidote to biomedical 
reductionism 
Psychologist as critical As critical, ethical, advocate for service user 
Psychologist as self-reflexive Praxis (reflection-action) what we bring 
Psychologist as curious Exploring concepts, enquiring more information, 
asking questions  
Psychologist as strategic Movement around systems, people, concepts, in 
order to achieve therapeutic goals or conflict 
Psychologist as skilled Positions psychologist as uniquely skilled via 
others (neo-Weberian) 
Psychologist as subversive Get referral for insight, but proceed as always do, 
don’t necessarily link to request (link collaborative 
– strategic) 
Psychologist as meaning maker Help team make meaning (link TMT) 
Help service user make meaning (link – skills, 
subversive, narrative 
Psychologist as collaborative With service user and link TMT, meaning maker,  
With team combat, strategic, subversive 
Psychologist as leader Showing leadership qualities, taking up positions 
of leadership, assumes senior roles either through 
character or position, exercise authority 
Psychologist as pragmatist pluralist, critical, non-relativist, and action-
orientated approach to theory and practice 
Psychologist as bio-psychosocial Biological, social and psychological theories 
Them no us We (psychology/team) don’t use insight but other 
professionals and/or groups do 
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Technologies 
 
Fx Formulation CC Cultural Capital Dx Diagnosis  
Ax Assessment R Risk Ix Intervention 
EBP Evidence based practice SR Self-reflexivity   
ΨM Psychologically minded S Supervision   
 
 
Power conceptualisations 
 
Reported constructs Major themes Initial conceptualisation 
  Relationships Technology 
 
Reproductive v re-productive 
 
Contested v con-tested 
 
Resist – acquiesce  
Complexity 
expertise 
Formulation 
Assessment 
Evidence based practice  
Self reflexivity 
Cultural capital  
 
 
 
Governmentality 
 
Bio-power 
Professional-power 
 
Teacher – pupil 
Policy power 
Humanism 
Political 
Formulation 
Assessment 
Evidence based practice  
Self reflexivity 
Cultural capital  
 
 
 
Pastoral Power 
 
 
 
 
Bio-power 
Transformative power 
 
Teacher – pupil 
Leadership 
Psychological mindedness 
Strategic - conflict 
Formulation 
Assessment 
Evidence based practice  
Self reflexivity 
Cultural capital  
 
 
 
Disciplinary 
 
 
 
 
Resist – acquiesce  
 
 
Hegemonic power 
 
Biomedicalism 
Formulation 
Assessment 
Evidence based practice  
Self reflexivity 
Cultural capital  
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APPENDIX M: ADDITIONAL TEXT RE: FOOTNOTE 5 
 
Re: footnote 5 the following extract describes in more detail the collaboration 
between psychologist and service user alluded to in the analysis   
 
(3461-3504) 
MM on, on the concept of say insight or whether say somebody, a service 
user has an illness, or is unwell, and requires our, an intervention? 
P4 yeah, oh okay, em, ((3)) I'm not sure if this will answer your question, it's 
something that's been quite recent in my work and being quite interesting 
em, eh, and so there’s an individual, the first person that I talked about 
that showed up and had a knife, he has ideas, he has recollections of 
being severely assaulted in 2006 and 2009, he says that between 2006 
and 2008 he went to Somalia where he was imprisoned and tortured, 
em, and eh, all these things are treated as sort of fixed ideas, also he 
says he's harassed my a sister and threatened by people in the 
community 
MM mhm 
P4 {BR} em::, I suppose because there are or other aspects of his behaviour 
that are a bit odd, and there is no corroborative evidence that these 
assaults actually happened 
MM hmm 
P4 em {BR} but in talking with him, so, so, this is, the orthodox view that 
these sort of {BR} hm::, the official stance on this individual is he's 
paranoid schizophrenic with fixed ideas about things that happened 
MM hm:: 
P4 although his care coordinator when he was referred to me did say, “you 
know, I don't know if some of this stuff has happened”  
MM mhm 
P4 but over the course of talking to him, I felt that his narrative was actually 
quite coherent, sort of he::, sort of, what's the word? em, sort of held 
together reasonably well, was unusual for somebody not to h::, who 
would be deemed not to have insight 
MM mhm 
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P4 he gave quite a clear account as to eh, clear, and from my view plausible 
account to how the original assault happened {BR}, and eh, {BR}, which 
involves him taking ownership and responsibility for eh various things 
that led up to the assault, not to say that it's his fault, but he was able to 
say, “I did these things, people felt this, and then they attacked me”. 
MM okay (22:00) 
P4 I also phoned a relative of his in Somalia the other day, which was an 
unusual thing 
MM mhm 
P4 em, and she basically corroborated as much of his story as she’d be able 
to, including the idea yeah he was in prison in Somalia for two years em, 
{BR}, and, so, basically, having gathered all this eh, {BR}, collateral 
history, eh:: brother back to speak to the psychiatrist, and the social 
worker, and it was interesting ‘cause, em, they were, kind of like, struck, 
and open to the idea that maybe this guy was telling the truth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
